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IN THE SUPREME COURT
of the STATE OF UTAH
In the Matter of the Estate
of
WILDA GAIL SWAN, Deceased.
THEO SWAN HENDEE,
Plaintiff and Respondent
vs.
WALKERBANK&TRUSTCOMPANY, Case No. 8246
EXECUTOR OF THE LAST WILL AND
TESTAMENT OF WILDA GAIL SWAN,
Deceased; GRANT MACFARLANE;
DANIEL KOSTOPULOS and
ADA BRIDGE,
Defendants and Appellants
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT
RAY, QUINNEY & NEBEKER
PAUL H. RAY
GRANT C. AADNESEN
Attorneys for Plaintiff
and Respondent
STATEMENT OF CASE
This is a law case tried below before the court without a jury. It is controlled by the rule announced by this
court in Hanson's Estate, 87 Utah 580, wherein it is said:
uThis is a law case. Therefore, we cannot disturb the findings if there is any competent evidence
to support them.''
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The lower court's findings of fact, conclusions of law
and judgment and its opinion are presented in the appendix which is bound herewith for the convenience of the
court.
The trial court heard all of the evidence and saw all of
the exhibits. Not only did the trial court see all that is
preserved in the record for review by this court, but saw
and observed the witnesses. Each witness who sat before
the court and testified was not only a purveyor of evidence, he was likewise an exhibit either for or against himself, and it was the trial court's opportunity, obligation
and duty to observe and evaluate each witness as such.
The court's eve1:luation of the key witness is set forth in
its opinion, appendix pages iv to ix.
The ((statement of facts" in appellants' brief either
ignores or so far slights the basic facts revealed by the evidence and found by the court to be the facts of the case
that respondent feels constrained to set them forth in advance of her argument.
For a correct understanding of the facts upon which
the trial court based its judgment we deem it necessary to
set forth an integrated and consecutive statement of the
facts, with particular attention to the facts in the record
which describe and characterize the testatrix, the beneficiaries named in the purported will, and codicils, and
other persons closely related to her in her lifetime. It is
the purported will and codicils of Wilda Gail Swan which
are the subjects of this litigation. It is therefore appropriate to expose the facts which show her nature, personality, and mentality at the times pertinent to this inquiry.
She will hereinafter be referred to as Gail.
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Gail was born in 1890, and died an unmarried and
childless woman in Salt Lake City on or about May 28,
1952. She left as her sole surviving heir at law her sister,
Theo Swan Hendee, who is contestant and respondent in
these proceedings. (R 129)
The facts relating to Gail's childhood are undisputed
and came largely from the testimony of Mrs. Bell Martsoff and Gail's sister, Mrs. Hendee. Gail's earliest years
were normal so far as the record indicates, and she was enrolled in the public schools of Salt Lake City in 1896 when
she was about the age of six years. (R 95) When she was
about eight years of age she began to show symptoms of
nervous disorder (R 95) which culminated when she was
about 11 years of age in epilepsy manifested by frequent
and violent seizures. (R 96, 254) Her health was so far
impaired that it was necessary for her parents to withdraw
her from school when she was about 11 years of age, and
she was never thereafter well enough to resume her schooling. (R 95, 100)
From and after the time Gail was withdrawn from
school she became the particular object of her parent's care
and attention. (R 96) Relief for her affliction was sought
by the parents both at home and at medical centers in the
midwest. (R 97) Her health was such that she was not
only withdrawn from school but from all contacts which
are normal to a growing child. (R 96, 103, 260) She was
denied the companionship of boys and girls of her own
age. Between the ages of 11 and 27, the years when a
normal girl develops into womanhood and has the greatest
desire and need for broadening social contacts, Gail was a
physical invalid and a complete social recluse. (R 100,
101, 260)
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She was so far sequestered that her only companions
were her immediate family, her Aunt Bell Martsolf, who
was approximately the same age as her mother, and such
persons as were from time to time employed in the household to assist in her care. (R 96, 103, 105, 106, 107, 108,
109)
Gail continued to be a victim of epilepsy to the end
of her life, but when she was about 27 years of age medication became available which if persistently given limited
the frequency and severity of epileptic seizures. (R 100,
10 1 ) It was ne.cessary during all the balance of her life
that she receive medication several times each day. (R
130, 265, 448)
It was the family custom to spend the winters in
California and the summers in Salt Lake City. (R 96)
Under the influence of constant medications Gail's health
improved and from the time she was 27 until nearly the
end of her life she was able to be up and about, except for
temporary sicknesses, and to participate to a limited extent
in the life of the family. Until her mother's death in
1931 she was constantly under the sheltering influence of
her mother. (R 96, 98, 100, 102) After her mother's
death in California her father brought her back to Salt
Lake and with the aid of such persons as he could employ
he supervised the details of Gail's life, and she continued
to be a recluse. She never had a boy friend of her own
age and never enjoyed the acquaintance of girls or women
of her own age. (R 103, 108, 266)
Gail's father died in 1950 an.d she spent her last two
years deprived of the care and attention of both of her
parents. Normal lives develop from normal contacts. The
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court found that Gail had never reached maturity either
mentally or emotionally. (App. xix R 263)
Five doctors were sworn and testified, three called by
the defendants and two by contestant. All of the medical
evidence was to the effect that Gail had the mind of a
child. (R 389, 465, 811, 812, 826, 827, 828, 829.) Her
mental development was given by Dr. Alvin Darke, a
psychiatrist called by the defendants, as that of a child 12
years of age. (R 808) On direct examination Dr. Nielson testified that Gail's mental capacity was adult, but
upon cross examination, he admitted that he had been
present during Dr. Darke's examination and that he concurred in Dr. Darke's conclusion that Gail's mental development had been arrested and that her mentality was
that of a child in the age bracket 11 to 13. (R 843)
The evidence of medical experts was supported by
that of Mrs. Grace Foulden, who had been a trained nurse
for more than 30 years, and who was nurse and companion
to Gail for many months. (R 402, 413)
From the long list of lay witnesses there came abundant testimony of Gail's immaturity, both mentally and
emotionally.
Typical of lay testimony which the trial court had
every right to believe, is the following from Gail's aunt,
Bell Martsolf, who was close to Gail nearly all the years of
her life:
c:c:* * ::· I wrote a candid letter to my niece.
uQ. Which niece?
c:c:A. This one here (indicating). Only had
those two.
uQ. You refer to the one here as your niece,
and one as your child?
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u.A. Gail has always been a child to me; because of her condition she was never normal, never
grew up like the rest of us; she couldn't be." (R.
284)
The combination of mental and emotional weakness
resulting from long years of sickness rendered Gail especially susceptible to any show of kindness from strangers,
especially male strangers.
In the year 1937 Gail was introduced to the witness
William L. Corbett. She had known the woman who later
became Mr. Corbett's wife for many years but had never
before met Corbett. Within a few minutes after their
meeting she became attracted to Mr. Corbett and proposed
that he become the manager of_ her properties. (R 542)
Jack Forsberg had been employed by Gail's father
to keep the family properties in repair and to assist in the
collection of rents. Through that employment he became
acquainted with Gail. Gail gave him $3,000.00 (R 212,
273) Somehow information respecting that gift became
known to Gail's father. He was angered by such infor-:mation and required Forsberg to return the money.
(R 271, 272, 273)
Management of the Swan family property was reposed in Walker Bank & Trust Company. (R 215-216)
The officers of the bank who had contact with Gail were
Joseph Fitzpatrick and Clair Mortenson. In the course
of managing the property they became acquainted with
Gail and were kind and courteous to her. She proposed
to Mr. Fitzpatrick that he be made beneficiary of part of
her property in her will. (R 667) He explained that he
could not accept any such arrangement, whereupon she
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proposed that Fitzpatrick's wife be made a beneficiary.
To that alternative Fitzpatrick demurred and explained
that it would be embarrassing to him if either he or his
wife were made beneficiary in her will. (R 667) She
then proposed to Mr. Mortenson that he become a devisee
under her will. He, like Fitzpatrick, made it plain that
he could not accept any such arrangement, and that it
would be embarrassing to him to be named as a beneficiary
in her will. (R 506) On at least two occasions Gail stated
to Dr. Frank that she would have her will drawn so that
he would be a beneficiary. ( R 464)
By 1944 Gail was well enough to participate in the
collection of rentals upon the family property. During
the fall of that year she became acquainted with appellant,
Grant Macfarlane, whom she called upon for legal advice.
(R 187> 188) From that time until her death the relationship of attorney and client existed between her and Macfarlane. (R 187 to 198) The details of the relationship
between Gail and Macfarlane are of dominating importance in these proceedings, but will be set forth in greater
length in connection with the facts relating to Macfarlane.
Gail first met Dan Kostopulos, who was the operator
of a moving picture theatre in Salt Lake City, about the
year 1933. (R 318) Kostopulos was 14 or 15 years younger than Gail, and his acquaintance was of a casual nature
until about the year 1949, six or eight months prior to the
death of Gail's father. (R 328) At that time Kostopulos
began calling frequently at Gail's home, and for the last
two years of Gail's life he was a daily visitor. (R 320, 591)
Further details with respect to the relationship between
Gail and Kostopulus will be supplied in connection with
the separate discussion of Kostopulos.
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Joseph Lamar Bridge was a plaster contractor.
(R 636) He had a wife and six children and a home in
Salt Lake County, south of Salt Lake City. (R 637) He
was in the military service during the war. While he
was away his wife sold and delivered poultry products to
customers in Salt Lake City. Among her customers was
the· Swan family. (R 604) In the course of her business
Mrs. Bridge became acquainted with Gail and often
stopped to visit. Upon his return from the service Mr.
Bridge began accompanying his wife to the Swan home.
While the Bridges were young enough to be children of
Gail, (R 608) and while they had a family of six, (R 607)
a plastering business, and a chicken farm, they managed
to see Gail on an average of three times a week during the
last two years of Gail's life. (R 63 8) During that period
they showed kindness to Gail. They were in the process
of building a house and Gail offered to give Bridge
· $3,000.00. (R 642) His testimony was that he declined,
to accept· it as a gift, but he accompanied Gail to the
Union Bank and Trust Company, where she drew from
savings $3,000.00 and handed it to Bridge in exchange for
a ((receipt" which Bridge said he wrote out, but which
could not be produced at the trial. (R 643, 644) According to Bridge, the receipt or note provided for no interest and :fixed no time for repayment. At least $1700.00
of the $3,000.00 was credited upon the note as gifts from
Gail. (R 646) The details of this transaction are set forth
in connection with the :findings of the court that Gail was
easily susceptible to those who attached themselves to her.
While Ada Bridge is no longer a party to these proceedings, it is necessary to have them in mind because they
complete the group which surrounded Gail during the
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two years following her father's death: Macfarlane, Kostopulos and the Bridges.

GRANT MACFARLANE
Most of the facts relating to the relationship between
Macfarlane and Miss Swan, and to the preparation of the
documents under attack in this proceeding, came from
Macfarlane himself.
At the time of the trial Macfarlane had been engaged
in the active practice of the law for 25 years, (R 186)
and had at the same time been engaged in business and
commercial enterprises. The court found that Macfarlane
was possessed of an attra.ctive and ingratiating personality. App. xix.
From the fall of 1944 until Gail's death he continued
to be Gail's attorney at law. (R 187, 189-197) Gail
called frequently at his office, sometimes seeking advice
in connection with business matters and sometimes seeking only the companionship of Macfarlane. (R 190)
She placed full co:fidence in Macfarlane both as her attorney at law and as her friend and he knew that such
confidence was reposed. (R 195) In the year 1945 Macfarlane called at Gail's home where he was made acquainted
with Gail's aged father. (R 141) Following that visit a
friendship developed between Macfarlane and Gail's father, and Macfarlane was entrusted with Mr. Swan's legal
problems. Thus a confidential relationship arose between
Macfarlane and Mr. Swan. (R 191)
During the years Macfarlane visited in Gail's home
from time to time, and in the course of his relationship
with Gail he became acquainted with Gail's sister who
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lived in San Francisco, but made frequent visits to Salt
Lake City and the family home. (R 193)
Macfarlane suffered an injury to one of his eyes which
required surgery and hospitalization. He was treated in
San Francisco and while there was shown many courtesies
by Mrs. Hendee and her husband. (R 199) A friendship
developed between Macfarlane and Mrs. Hendee. Mrs.
Hendee reposed full confidence in him. (R 198) He
knew that she had confidence in him and that she and her
father depended upon him to protect Gail and her interests. (R, 19 8)
For all legal services rendered by Macfarlane to either
Gail or her father, Macfarlane sent bills and was paid the
reasonable value of his services. (R 241)
After Gail's death there were admitted to probate a
purported will dated May 2, 1947, a codicil dated February
20, 1950, and a codicil dated April 23, 1951. Within the
time provided by law respondent and contestant filed her
complaint and contest which is here under review. The
will, as stated above, is dated May 2, 1947. At that time
Macfarlane had been Gail's attorney at law for nearly
three years. The confidential relationship thus arising had
not only persisted for three years, but had been fortified
by friendly non-professional contacts from time to time.
The court found that on the date the will was written
Macfarlane must have been aware of Gail's immaturity,
both mentally and emotionally. App. xix. He also found
from the evidence given by Macfarlane that Gail had
been emotionally upset because of Macfarlane's illness and
the expense attendant upon surgical treatment and hospitalization. App. xxiii (R 236)
The will was drawn by Macfarlane in his own office.
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(R 202) Gail went there entirely alone. (R 203) She
brought with her a prior will. The will was not produced
upon the trial, but Macfarlane testified that by its terms
Gail's estate was bequeathed and devised to her father. (R 202) Macfarlane then and there dictated the
will now under attack and caused it to be attested by two
witnesses of his own selection-one of whom was his private secretary, the other a stranger to Gail. (R 204) By
the terms of the will Macfarlane was made beneficiary
of property having a value of approximately $100,000.00
representing more than one-third of the entire estate.
Ex-(R 664)
At the time the will was prepared by Macfarlane and
executed by Gail, she had no independent advice of any
kind. Macfarlane offered no suggestion that she should
seek advice from anyone else. (R 205, 211) She relied,
and he knew she relied, solely upon his advice. (205, 211,
206)
The first codicil admitted to probate and now under
attack is dated February 20, 1950. At that time Macfarlane had been Gail's attorney at law for approximately 6
years. Between the signing of the will and the first
codicil, a matter of nearly three years, Macfarlane had continued to be the attorney at law and confidential friend
of Gail. She continued to be a frequent visitor at his office, and he continued from time to time to visit her home.
The court found that there was no interruption in or
weakening of the confidential relationship existing between Gail and Macfarlane during the years following the
execution of the purported will. (App. xxi~)
When the first codicil was written Gail again called
at Macfarlane's office entirely alone. (R 206) Macfar-
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lane then and there prepared the first codicil and had it
attested by his secretary and a lawyer who occupied space
in the same suite. (R 206, 207) The lawyer who witnessed
the will is Irwin Clawson. Macfarlane testified that Clawson did not read the will or hear it read. Clawson was
sworn as a witness by appellant but did not testify that he
had ever given any advice to Gail upon any subject whatever.
As in the case of the purported will, Gail had no independent advice of any kind, and Macfarlane testified
that he offered no suggestion that she have independent
advice, and that he assumed that she had had none. (R 207)
By the codicil Macfarlane was designated as the beneficiary
of property worth more than $100,000.00
By April 1950 Gail's father had been overtaken by
his final illness which culminated in his death in the following June. In April 1950, two months after the signing of the first codicil, Macfarlane prepared and caused
Gail to sign and deliver to him a full and general power of
attorney, making him her attorney in fact. (R 229-230)
The acceptance of a general power of attorney from Gail
must have been born of a consciousness upon the part of
Macfarlane that Gail was in need of care and attention beyond that contemplated by the ordinary attorney and
client relationship. It could have resulted from Gail's
knowledge of her own lack of capacity. In either case, it
is proof of the extraordinary confidence Gail had in Macfarlane. The obligation thus imposed upon Macfarlane
was commensurate with the trust bestowed. Macfarlane
was examined as an adverse witness, and upon being interrogated about the power of attorney stated that except for
the manipulation of certain savings accounts in Union
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Trust Company in Salt Lake City, (R 230) and except
for his participation in the execution and delivery of a
lease, he had not exercised any of the powers granted to
him by Gail. (R 234) He was thereafter confronted
with certain documents (Exhibits 16, 17, 10) after which
he made a disclosure of the extent to which he had exercised his powers as attorney in fact.
He participated in the sale of certain unimproved
real estate belonging to Gail. (R 242) Following the sale
of the real estate certain securities were acquired by Gail.
They consisted of $3,000.00 par value of United States
Government bonds, 100 shares of Utah Power and Light
Company stock, and 80 shares of Westinghouse Electric.
The securities thus acquired were delivered to Walker
Bank and Trust Company for Gail's account. (R 236)
In April 1951, as Gail's attorney in fact, Macfarlane
withdrew the securities above referred to. (R 136) He
caused the 100 shares of Utah Power and Light stock to
be transferred into the name of Daniel Kostopulos, and
the 8 0 shares of Westinghouse Electric stock to be transferred to his own name. (R 236, 237) He permitted Gail
to deliver the Utah Power and Light stock to Dan Kostapulos, who sold the same and retained the proceeds for
himself (R 325, 327) The $3,000.00 of U. S. Government bonds were divided equally between Macfarlane and
Kostopulos. (R 239, 327) As far as the record shows,
Gail never owned or possessed any interest-bearing securities except those just referred to. (R 2 39, 3 27)
The year following the death of Gail's father, Macfarlane as attorney in fact caused certain changes to be
made with respect to funds belonging to Gail and upon
deposit in Union Trust Company, Salt Lake City. (R 231)
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The funds totalled approximately $20,000.00. After the
changes were made by Macfarlane as attorney in fact,
$4797.50 stood in the bank in the name of Gail Swan and
Grant Macfarlane, and the same amount in the name of
Gail Swan and Daniel Kostopulos and his wife. (R 232,
233) Neither Macfarlane nor Kostopulos had any interest in the balance of the funds upon deposit. Between
the time when the savings accounts were thus adjusted
and Gail's death the accounts not in the name of Macfarlane or Kostopulos were substantially exhausted while the
accounts in the name of Macfarlane and Kostopulos remained substantially unimpaired. (R 232, 233) At the
time of Gail's death the amounts still on deposit in the
names of Macfarlane and Kostopulos were the same$4,597.17. (R 232, 233)
Macfarlane also participated in the granting of a
long-term lease by Gail to Dan Kostopulos covering a valuable piece of real estate on South State Street in Salt Lake
City. (R 250)
The second and last codicil is dated A pral 2, 19 51.
By then Macfarlane had been Gail's attorney at law and
confidential friend and business adviser for nearly seven
years. The confidential nature of their relationship had
grown stronger with the passage of years, and Gail's trust
and confidence in Macfarlane was complete. At that time
he had been Gail's attorney in fact for one year. The
court found that her arrested mental and emotional development must have been obvious to Macfarlane.
(App. xxvi)
At the time the second codicil was drawn a confidential relationship had existed between Gail and Kosto-
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pulos for more than two years, during which Kostopulos
had made almost daily visits to Gail seeing her often enough
that there could never be any relaxation or deterioration
of the relationship between them. (R 591)
Macfarlane drew the second codicil. (R 208) It was
drawn under circumstances substantially the same as those
surrounding the preparation of the will and the first
codicil. Here again Gail came alone. (R 210) She had
no independent advice and no suggestion from Macfarlane
that she should seek independent advice. (R 210, 211)
There was, however, a departure from previous procedure.
It is clear that prior to the execution of the second codicil
doubt had arisen as to Gail's testamentary capacity. Macfarlane testified that it was Gail who suggested the desirability of a medical examination, but from all the circumstances the court found that it was Macfarlane who saw
the advantage of medical witnesses. Gail had been under
the care of Dr. William Pace, a psychiatrist, and her family
physician was Dr. Emery Frank, who was thoroughly familiar with Gail's condition.
Macfarlane called upon
neither Pace nor Frank in connection with the execution
of the codicil. Macfarlane arranged to have an examination made by Dr. A.M. Nielson. (R 837, 838) He then
arranged to have Kostopulos call at Gail's home and bring
her to Dr. Nielson,s office where Macfarlane was waiting
with the will. (R 3 31) Dr. Nielson made a physical examination. (R 838) He then called in Dr. Roy A. Darke,
a psychiatrist, and the two of them examined Gail Swan
and then signed the second codicil as attesting witnesses.
(R 839) Macfarlane and Kostopulos were both present
when the second codicil was signed but were not present
during some of the conversations between the doctors and
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Gail. When they were not in the actual presence of Gail
they were in the adjoining room. (R 3 31)
Upon direct examination Drs. Darke and Nielson
both testified that Gail was competent to sign the codicil
for the reason that she clearly understood the nature of her
property, and clearly understood the persons who were
to benefit by her will. They both testified that upon inquiry as to who were to be beneficiaries under her will she
gave them the names of seven persons: Oscar Burnside
Beam, her brother-in-law Harold C. Hundee, Joseph Lamar Bridge, Ada Bridge, Theo Hendee, Grant Macfarlane
and Dan Kostopulos. The names of her intended beneficiaries were given to the doctors as she was about to sign
the codicil which is here under attack. (R 807, 843) An
inspection of the codicil will disclose that three of the seven beneficiaries named by the testatrix were omitted from
the codicil. Immediately following the examination of
Gail and the execution of the second codicil, Dr. Darke
mailed his written report to Macfarlane, in which he stated
that Gail had named the seven persons above listed as her
intended beneficiaries. (R 807) Macfarlane did not deny
the receipt of Dr. Drake's report and did not claim that
he ever took the matter up with Gail to clear up the omission of the three names.
It is significant to note that at the time Macfarlane
prepared the first codicil, by which he would be enriched
by more than $100,000.00, he was a defendant in a case
pending in the Third Judicial District Court in which he
was accused of preparing the Last Will and Testament of
one Becker, whereby he became a principal beneficiary.
In that proceeding he was accused of abusing his confi-
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dential relationship and procuring Becker's will by fraud
and undue influen.ce~ (R 221)
DANIEL KOSTOPULOS
Daniel Kostopulos was a witness in his own behalf.
He was observed by the court as he testified, and the court
in his evaluation of his credibility concluded that he was
not worthy of belief. From his testimony it appears that
he first became acquainted with Gail about 19 3 3. (R 318)
He did not become a frequent visitor in the Swan home
until near the end of Mr. Swan's life. (R 320) During
the last two and a half years of Gail's life, and the last six
months of her father's life, Kostopulos was a constant
visitor at the Swan home. (R 320) He frequently drove
Gail on errands, ( R 3 2 5) and often took groceries or other
things to Gail's home. He testified that his attention to
Gail and the numerous small gifts made to her were done
purely out of charity for one who seemed to be in need
of help. (R 326) He stated that she was in need of money
from time to time and that he made small loans to her.
(R 341)
In 1951, after her father's death, Kostopulos accepted
from Gail 100 shares of Utah Power and Light stock
(R 325) and $1500.00 par value of U. S. Government
bonds. (R 327) During the time that he was making
daily visits to the Swan home he was keeping a detailed
account of all the small loans made and all purchases made
in behalf of Gail. ( R 3 3 6) Upon her death he filed a
claim against her estate for $2,000.00, and when the executor refused to pay it he brought suit. (R 336) As
time went on and his relationship with Gail grew closer
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and closer, he undertook to alienate from Gail's affection
not only Gail's sister, Mrs. Hendee, but other persons closely identified with Gail's life. His daily visits to the home
kept him fully aware of all the details of Gail's life, and he
knew in advance from time to time when Gail's sister,
Theo, was about to make a visit from San Francisco. (R
461-462) On many occasions just prior to such a visit
he took Gail to her attending physician, D. Emory Frank.
He told Dr. Frank that Mrs. Hendee was coming to Salt
Lake and suggested to Dr. Frank that he ((dope up Gail"
to the point she uwould be very quiet" while her sister was
visiting. (R 462)
While Gail was hospitalized for her final illness, her
sister was in close attendance upon her at the hospital.
Kostopulos induced Dr. Frank to the belief that Gail was
made nervous and unhappy by her sister's presence. Mrs.
Hendee complied with Dr. Frank's request and remained
away from the hospital for two or three days. Dr. Frank
then learned that Gail's greatest desire was to have her sister by her bedside, after which he asked Mrs. Hendee to
resume her attendance at the hospital. (R 457, 458) During her last days her only requests were that her sister be
nearby. (R 457, 458, 459 and 460)
He resented the close companionship developed between Ada Bridge and her husband on the one hand and
Gail on the other. On the occasion of one of Mrs. Hendee's visits Kostopulos suggested that she should put a stop
to the association between Gail and Bridges ((because the
Bridges are getting too mu.ch money from Gail." (R 183184.
Kostopulos disliked the supervision of Gail by the
trained nurse, Mrs. Foulden. Accordingly, he took Mac-
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farlane to the office of Dr. Frank and there persuaded Dr.
Frank that it would be in the best interest of Gail's health
if Mrs. Foul den should be discharged. (R 454)
Kostopulos denied some of the facts above set forth,
but they were testified to under oath by other witnesses
whom the court had the right to believe as against the
testimony of Kostopulos.
Kostopulos testified that he never knew he was to be
a beneficiary under Gail's will until after Gail's death.
(R 332) Against such testimony is the evidence that
Kostopulos was present when the second codicil was read
and signed. (R 3 32) Against this testimony also was the
testimony of Arvid Butler, a wholly disinterested witness.
Butler testified that during Gail's life he had inquired of
Kostopulos how he was doing in the motion picture business and Kostopulos answered that he wasn't worried about
the motion picture business because a rich woman was going to leave him a hotel. (R 355) Thereafter he identified
Gail Swan to Mr. Butler as the rich woman who was going to leave him a hotel. ( R 3 57, 3 5 8 ) It is the first codicil
which refers to the devise to Kostopulos as a hotel. Wherefore, it was entirely competent for the court to find that
Kostopulos knew about the first codicil, and from that time
on expected to inherit the hotel on West Broadway. Such
expectation would be realized if he saw to it that his confidential relationship and control over Gail was not allowed to deteriorate.
Kostopulos also told Butler after Gail's death that
Macfarlane had made a mistake when he eliminated Mr.
Beam from the will. (R 359) It was entirely competent
for the court to conclude that Kostopulos made such state-
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ment because he knew it was Gail's intention to provide
for Mr. Beam.
ADA BRIDGE
While Ada Bridge is no longer a party to these proceedings, it is important to see what the record reveals
with respect to her and her husband.
When we have pointed out the facts with respect to
Macfarlane, Kostopulos, the Bridges and Mrs. Hendee, we
.will have covered all persons closely identified with Gail,
except for nurses and hired companions.
Mrs. Bridge and her husband were almost young
enough to be the .children of Gail. (R 63 5, 63 8, 608)
They· had domestic and business concerns and friends of
their own age ample to absorb all of their time and attention. Notwithstanding this, they made three trips a week
from the south end of the county to go to Gail's home on
the north side of Salt Lake City, (R 638) and frequently
had Gail at their own home. (R 606) We have heretofore set forth the facts with respect to the so-called loan
of $3,000.00 from Gail to Mr. Bridge. The Bridges, like
Kostopulos permitted nothing to interfere with the persistence of their visits. Neither participated in the execution of the will or either codicil.
THEO SWAN HENDEE
Theo Swan Hendee is the sole surviving heir at law
of Gail Swan, and is respondent and contestant in these
proceedings. (R 129, 30) She was two or three years older
than Gail, and in all respects normal, mentally and phys-
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ically. She began her early schooling at the Wasatch
school in Salt Lake City, (R 96) but because the family
spent its winters in California she was enrolled in a high
school in southern California. (R 96) In due time she
was graduated from Vassar College (R 98) and thereafter did postgraduate work at the University of Utah.
After finishing college she taught in a high school in Idaho.
She was married to Harold Hendee in 1914. (R 98) He
was engaged in newspaper business in Michigan until 1922
when he and Theo moved to San Francisco. (R 99) They
never had any children. Mr. Hendee continued in the
newspaper business until his death which occurred within
a few days of the death of Gail Swan. (R 126) At the
time of his death, and for many years prior thereto, Mr.
Hendee had been associated in an editorial capacity with
the West Coast Division of the Wall Street Journal. The
evidence in the record is that Mr. Hendee never accumulated any wealth and that Mrs. Hendee never inherited
anything substantial from him. (R 848)
During all the years that Mrs. Hendee lived in San
Francisco she made frequent visits to Salt Lake City. On
the occasion of such visits she lived at the family home and
helped out with family affairs, including domestic and
business concerns. (R 105, 108, 110-115) In between visits
she wrote frequently and often telephoned. (R 107, 112)
She consulted with her father upon business affairs of the
family, and with the several banking institutions which,
from time to time, had the family business in charge. (R
121, 158) Gail was not a frequent visitor at Mrs. Hendee's
home in California. Mrs. Hendee testified that Gail was dependent for guidance and companionship upon her father,
and that her father so disliked the climate of northern Cali-
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fornia that he would not go there. Bell Martsolf was the
aunt of Gail and Mrs. Hendee. She lived in Redlands,
California. All through the years from time to time Mrs.
Hendee paid the expenses of Mrs. Martsolf so that she
might go from Redlands to Salt Lake City and be with
and give aid and comfort to Gail and her father. (R Ill)
The record shows that the women closest to Gail during the last few years of her life were Mrs. Ada Bridge, one
of the defendants below, Mrs. Emory Frank, wife of the
family doctor, and Mrs. Ruth Corbett, daughter of an
old friend and companion of the Swan family. Each
testified with respect to the relationship between Gail and
her sister, Theo.
In the testimony of Ruth Corbett this appears at 515
on the record:

uQ. Did you observe whether or not Theo and
Gail had a pleasant relationship?"
u.A. Very affectionate."
In the testimony of Vinita Frank at 510 and 512 of
the record this appears:

uQ.
u.A.
uQ.
c'"A.
uQ.
u.A.
uQ.
visit?
u.A.
u.Q.
ccA.

Did Gail ever talk about Theo to you?
Yes.
What did she say?
She liked her.
She told you that?
Yes.
Did she tell you of Theo's com1ng to
Yes.
What did she say?
She was very happy she was coming.

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

23

uQ. Did you observe the relationship between
Theo and Gail?
uA. Y es.
((Q. What kind of relationship was it?
((A. Very affectionate."
Defendant Ada Bridge when asked whether she was
close to Gail answered, uShe claimed to be a part of our
family." (R 609) She later testified that ((the relationship
between Gail and Theo was very good." (R 620)
Upon the question of the relationship between Gail
and her sister some illumination may be had from an examination of the will and the codicils. They were written and their execution supervised by Macfarlane. He admitted that the language of all three documents was his,
and (R. 222) that he supplied the adjectives. In the will
and in both the codicils Gail's sister is referred to as ((my
beloved sister, Theo Swan Hendee." Macfarlane stated
that the term ubeloved" was introduced into each of the
documents by him. (R 222) Macfarlane had an intimate
knowledge of Gail and knew her sister well. Surely the
court was fully justified in :finding that Macfarlane knew
that in Gail's heart there was an abiding affection for Theo.
At the close of the case after both sides had rested and
the trial court had heard arguments of counsel, both oral
and written, he made and :filed his opinion and thereafter
signed and :filed his Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law
and Judgment, whereby he adjudged that at the time the
contested will and codicils were made Gail lacked testamentary capacity to make them, and that they were made
as the result of fraud and undue influence practiced upon
her by Macfarlane and Kostopulos.
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ARGUMENT
With respect to Gail's testamentary capacity we are
willing to here repeat the statement we made in our memorandum to the trial court, that the proof of lack of testamentary capacity in the record is less compelling than that
of undue influence. If Gail's mental capacity could have
been considered in a vacuum wholly unrelated to the circumstances of her life and the pressure and influences
which were exerted upon her, one might conclude that she
had mentality enough to understand her property and select those to whom she desired to bequeath it.
This case is in some of its aspects much like In Re
Hanson's Estate, 87 Utah 580, 52 Pac. (2d) 1103. At the
end of its opinion in that case this court said:
((While there may be some doubt as to whether
the decedent lacked testamentary capacity, there is
no doubt but that it was a mind easily capable of
being influenced. The evidence relating to Marie's
mentality and general nervous control is therefore
material and of aid not only in determining testamentary capacity, but to determine what sort of
a subject Dr. McDonald had to play upon."
It has been established in this case beyond any reasonable dispute that Gail was of simple and childish mind and
of subnormal emotional development. She was a weak and
ready subject for the play of influence by Macfarlane and
Kostopulos. As stated by this court in the Hanson case, a
strong mind might have withstood the influence of Macfarlane and Kostopulos, but Gail's childish and susceptible
mind gave way to the influence of those who occupied a
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confidential relationship toward her, and once it had yielded to the strong minds of those about her she no longer had
a testamentary capacity.
Evidence of her inability to persist in any mental decision was made clear by the testimony of Dr. Darke. Just
before she signed the second codicil she gave to Dr. Darke
and Dr. Nielson the names of those whom she expected to
be her beneficiaries. She named seven persons, who were
to be the objects of her bounty, and yet almost immediately thereafter put her signature to a document by which
she eliminated three of those seven persons.
With respect to the finding of the court that the will
and the codicils resulted from the fraud and undue influence of the defendants, Macfarlane and Kostopulas, our
research has taught us that no court of last resort has ever
held that facts such as those related above are insufficient
to sustain a judgment setting aside a will. On the contrary, testamentary documents such as those here under
attack in similar circumstances have been universally condemned by the courts.
Macfarlane was a mature and seasoned lawyer and
business man. He was Gail's attorney at law, her attorney
in fact and her confidential friend. Gail, on the other
hand, was a childish and simple woman lacking in normal
emotional development. She bestowed upon him and he
accepted her full confidence. Macfarlane prepared and
supervised the execution of her will and both codicils by
which he would enrich himself to the extent of approximately $100,000.00, or substantially more than one-third
of her entire estate.
Not only was Gail the weak one and Macfarlane the
strong one, but in connection with the execution of the
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purported will and codicils she had no independent advice.
No such advice was ever suggested, and Gail relied solely
upon the advice of her beneficiary.
Kostopulos was Gails confidential friend. She bestowed upon him and he accepted her full confidence. He
participated in the execution of the second codicil by which
he also would be enriched to the amount of approximately
$100,000.00.
The foregoing are the essential or basic facts of the
case and they cannot be evaporated or combed out of the
record by resort to any legal or equitable phraseology or
nomenclature. They are fa~ts, not inferences or presumptions. Being the facts of the case they lead to certain legal
results. As to what those legal results are, our views and
those of appellants are in direct conflict.
Appellants admit that the facts of the case give rise
to a presumption of undue influence because of the confidential relationship existing between Gail and the defendants, but they assert that as soon as Macfarlane and
Kostopulos testified respecting the execution of the testamentary documents the probative force of the facts above
referred to, as well as any presumption produced thereby,
vanished and nothing remained in the case to sustain a
judgment for contestants.
Our contention is that the facts above recited are so
~ull of weight and substance, and are of such probative
force, that they compel a conclusion of fraud and undue
influence until the absence of such vices is affirmatively
and clearly shown by the defense.
Upon filing her contest alleging fraud and undue influence contestant assumed the burden of proof. In discharge of that burden she made proof of the basic facts
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above detailed. When such proof was made the burden
was then cast upon defendants to prove by clear and convincing evidence the absence of fraud and undue influence.
It was up to the trial court as the trier of the facts to determine whether defendant had furnished the necessary
proof. Death had stilled the tongue of Gail, and the trial
court was not required to accept the mere statement of
Macfarlane or Kostopulos with respect to the presence or
absence of fraud or undue influence. The trial court was
at liberty and he was charged with the duty of evaluating
the credibility of Macfarlane and Kostopulos, and weighing the quantum and the quality of their evidence against
the facts which so powerfully bespeak the exercise of fraud
and undue influence. The rule just stated and for which
we here contend has been announced by many courts of
last resort, and except for one or two possible exceptions
to which we will refer they are unanimous in supporting
our position.
It is appropriate to first give consideration to the decisions of this court. No will case has been before this court
involving facts comparable to those contained in the record
just now under review. The nearest is the case of In Re
Hanson's Will, supra. This court had no difficulty in
that case in sustaining a finding of the lower court that the
will was the product of undue influence.
It is contended by appellants in their brief, and the
contention is much labored, that the presumption vanishes
when evidence comes into the case. By their argument
they would induce the court to rule that no matter how
close the confidential relationship, no matter how weak the
one bestowing confidence, and no matter how strong the
other, a court or jury would be unable to find the existence
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of undue influence if the beneficiary of the confidential
relationship should simply deny the existence of fraud or
undue influence. Such a ruli~g would be controry to all
the authority upon the subject and to the sound social policy of maintaining decent confidential relationshi:(js. Appellants' position, if accepted, would result in an adjudication
that any presumption created by the facts disappears when
there is testimony relating to the subject. That such is
not the law is perfectly obvious.
Approached from some directions the meaning and
effect of a presumption may seem to be altogether illusive,
but there is no need for confusion in the application of the
law to the facts of this case. This court's prior decisions
and the abundant and almost unanimous authority from
other jurisdictions leaves the matter clear. The legal results
flowing from the relationship between the parties to this
proceeding have been clearly recognized. Whether those
results were referred to as presumptions is of no importance. The basic facts proven are of such substance and of
such probative value that their establishment must result
in the conviction that undue influence has been exercised,
and such conviction can be dissipated and overcome only
by clear and satisfactory proof that there was no undue
influence.
Appellants refer to the legal result as a presumption
and then argue that because such result is a presumption
it vanishes from the case and cannot be weighed by the
court in arriving at the court's conclusion. Some presumptions may disappear as soon as evidence of the facts
is introduced, but many do not so disappear but persist to
the very end. It depends upon their nature and their
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quality, and upon the fact, or the absence of facts which
give rise to their existence.
Perhaps the most widely knqwn of all presumptions is
the presumption of innocence which clings to a defendant
charged with crime from the beginning to the end of the
case. It takes proof beyond all reasonable doubt to overcome that presumption.
We will a little later refer to the many cases from
other jurisdictions which have dealt with the situation presented by the evidence in this case. For the moment we
desire to discuss the law of presumptions as announced by
this Court. There is an exhaustive discussion of the subject by Mr. Justice Wade in his concurring opinion in the
Pilcher case ( 114 Utah 72, 84). In that case it appears
that Pilcher married Mabel in Lyon County, Kansas, in
19 0 1. Children were born to the couple but Pilcher and
Mabel separated and lived apart for many years. In 1941
Pilcher married Mildred in Logan, Utah. Pilcher thereafter died and Mildred, representing herself to be the surviving widow, applied for and received letters of administration. In the course of the administration of the estate
a son of Mabel came from California to Logan and made
a settlement with Mildred whereby he received $3,000.00
from the estate for himself and his brothers and sisters.
Thereafter Mildred filed her final account and petition for
distribution. At that point Mabel filed her petition claiming that she was the surviving widow of Pilcher and asking
that she be substituted as administratrix. She testified
that she had never brought any divorce proceedings against
Pilcher, and that she had never been served with any papers
in any action instituted by Pilcher. She further testified
that she had seen Pilcher not long before his death and that
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Pilcher had told her that he had never divorced her. Mildred, on the other hand, testified that he had stated to her
that he had divorced Mabel. The lower court, believing
that Mabel was the surviving widow of Pilcher, entered
its order discharging Mildred as administratrix and appointing Mabel. Upon appeal it was contended by Mildred that there was a presumption that her marriage to
Pilcher in Logan in 1941 was a valid marriage which could
be overcome only by clear and convincing evidence, and
that Mabel had failed to produce any such proof.
This Court agreed with Mildred and reversed the lower court. In its final conclusion this court stated that
there was a presumption of validity which attached to the
marriage ceremony between Pilcher and Mildred, and he
closed with this sentence: ((Such presumption persists until
it is overcome by clear, convincing and conclusive evidence."
The decision in the Pilcher case is a conclusive answer
to the suggestion of the defendants that the presumption
of undue influence has vanished from the instant case. One
reason why this court assigned persistent vitality to the
presumption of marriage is that such a presumption is
socially desirable. It is socially desirable that persons in
confidential and dominating relationship with subnormal
people should not be allowed to capitalize upon that relationship.
It is especially desirable socially that the standards of
members of the bar be maintained at such a level that
clients may repose full confidence in their lawyers without fear that that confidence might be abused. It is noteworthy that this court in the Pilcher case ruled that to
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overcome a socially desirable presumption the evidence
must be uclear, convincing and conclusive."
Recently this Court again discussed presumptions in
Meacham v. Allen, 262 P. (2d) 285. In that case this
court affirmed a judgment against the contention of appellants that it was error for the trial court to instruct the
jury that it might consider in arriving at its verdict the
presumption that decedent was in the exercise of due care
at the time of the fatal collision. In the course of its dis·Cussion on the subject of presumptions the court observed
that some presumptions disappear when evidence was introduced, but it went on from there to say:
u* * ~· but there are other so-called presumptions, which require more than a prima facie case
to make them ineffective. Some place the burden
of proof, or persuasion on the party claiming the
nonexistence of the presumed facts, others require
clear and convincing evidence to overcome such
presumption and still others require proof beyond
a reasonable doubt before the trier of the facts may
find that the presumed facts do not exist. In such
cases the court in the first instance would have to
determine that there is sufficient evidnece to support the finding, and leave it to the jury to decide
whether the evidence has the required persuasive
force."
There are three decisions of this court which leave
it clear beyond any doubt that the burden lay upon the
defendants to clearly prove the absence of undue influence.
They are Peterson v. Budge, 35 Utah 596, 102 Pac. 211,
Omega lnvest~ent Co. v. Woolley, 72 Utah 474, 271 Pac.
797, and Jardene v. Archibald, decided Jan. 24, 1955 and
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reported in the February 24th advance sheet of Pacific
Reporter at page 454.
In the first of them it appears that Budge was a doctor
and accepted a deed to real estate from Peterson who was
his patient. Peterson sued to set aside the deed upon the
ground that Budge took advantage of a confidential relationship and got the deed through undue influence.
Budge denied the confidential relationship and the undue
influence. The trial court found for Budge and dismissed
the case. This court reversed and ordered findings in behalf of Peterson. The courts opinion fully supports our
contentions in the case now under review. We take the
liberty of here setting down an extended excerpt from the
optnton:
ccThere is no rule of law more firmly established than that which holds that transactions between persons occupying fiduciary or confidential
relations with each other, in which the stronger or
superior party obtains an advantage over the other,
cannot be upheld. In the case of Viallet v. Con.
Ry. & P. Co., 30 Utah 260, 84 Pac. 496, 5 L.R.A.
(N .S.) 613, a question involving this same principle
was before this court, and in the course of the
opinion it said:
·cThe law is well settled that from the time
the relation of physician and patient is created, until it ceases to exist, the physician is not only legally
bound to act in the utmost good faith in his treatment of his patient professionally, but he is inhibited from taking advantage of the confidence growing out of this relation, reposed in him by his
patient, and, by misrepresentation, or other unfair
u
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means, or by the exercise of undue influence, induce
his patient to convey, transfer, or otherwise dispose
of, to such physician, or to other parties whom the
physician may represent in other capicities valuable
property rights for a wholly inadequate consideration.'
uAnd the rule is well settled that in actions
of this kind, where these confidential relations are

shown to exist, the purden of proof is cast upon the
superior party to esta.blish the perfect fairness, adequacy of consideration, and equity of the transaction. In Smith, Law of Fraud, section 190, the
author says:
u (While equity does not deny the possibility
of valid transactions between the two parties, yet,
because every fiduciary relation implies a condition
of superiority held by one of the parties over the
other, in every transaction between them by which
the superior party obtains a possible benefit, equity
raises a presumption against its validity, and casts
upon that party the burden of proving affirmatively its compliance with equitable requisites, and
thereby overcoming the presumption.'
rrlt having been shown that the confidential
relation of physician and patient existed between
the Budges and Peterson at the time the sale took
place, the burden of proof shifted, and it beca.me
necessary for the Budges, in order to uphold the
sale, to show that it was for an adequate cons~dera
tion, and that the entire transaction on their part
was in every pa.rticular fair, just, and equitable."
(Italics supplied)
Omega Investment v. Woolley, supra, is even stronger. In that case it appears that Woolley procured an important stock interest in plaintiff corporation from Bald-
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win, who owned control. Woolley was neither a lawyer
nor a doctor, but he gained Baldwin's full confidence and
the court held that Woolley stood in a confidential relationship to Baldwin. In affirming a judgment setting
aside the transfer and restoring the stock the Supreme
Court made some statements which vastly illuminate the
case under discussion:
((There can be no question but that the trial
court was justified in drawing the conclusion that
a fiduciary relation existed between Baldwin and
Woolley at the time the stock in question in this
case was transferred. In fact, no other conclusion
can reasonably be drawn. Woolley came into the
employ of Baldwin as an agent to settle important
litigation that was not finally and completely settled until the day the negotiations for the transfer
of the stock began. From the time of ·Baldwin's
acquaintance with him in January of 1924, he
constantly manifested an interest in Baldwin's welfare, permitting his office to become the center of
discussions with reference to the Baldwin interests.
He proffered and endeavored to secure moneys to
overcome the financial necessities, advised and conferred with him, and in every action so conducted
himself as to induce Baldwin to believe that Woolley
was constantly working for Baldwin's welfare.
confidential relation exists when confidence is reposed by one party and a trust accepted
by the other, when a confidence has been imposed
and betrayed, or when influence has been acquired
and abused. It embraces both technical and fiduciary relations and those informal relations where
one man trusts in and relies on another.' Dale v.
Jennings, 90 Fla. 234, 107 So. 175.
cc cA

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

35

uThe confidential relation being shown to
exist, the burden devolved upon Woolley to show
that, in the making of the transaction, the fullest
and fairest explanation and communication was
made to Baldwin of every particular in Woolley's
breast; that the transaction itself was fair, and the
consideration paid therefor adequate, before a court
is justified in permitting the transaction to stand.
c:c:While equity does not deny the possibility of
valid transactions between the two parties, yet because every fiduciary relation implies a condition
of superiority held by one of the parties over the
other, in every transaction between them by which
the superior party obtains a possible benefit, equity
raises a presumption against its validity, and casts
upon that party the burden of proving affirmatively its compliance with equitable requisites, and of
thereby overcoming the presumption. ~· ~· *
u c:Wherever two persons stand in such a relation that, while it continues, confidence is necessarily reposed by one, and the influence which naturally grows out of that confidence is possessed by
the other, and this confidence is abused, or the influence is exerted to obtain an advantage at the
expense of the confiding party, the person so availing himself of his position will not be permitted
to retain the advantage, although the transaction
could not have been impeached if no such confidential relation had existed. Courts of equity have
carefully refrained from defining the particular
instances of fiduciary relations in such a manner
that other and perhaps new cases might be excluded. It is settled by an overwhelming weight of
authority that the principle extends to every possible case in which a fiduciary relation exists as a
fact, in which there is confidence reposed on one
side, and the resulting superiority and influence on
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the other. The relation and the duties involved
in it need not be legal; it may be moral, social, domestic, or merely personal.' 2 Pomeroy, Equity
Jurisprudence, Sec. 956. xxx
ttThe rule as applied between attorney and
client is well stated by the Supreme Court of California in Cooley v. Miller & Lux, 156 Cal. 510, 105
P. 981, as follows:
cc c:The presumption always arises against the
validity of a purchase or sale between the client and
attorney made during the existence of the relation.
The attorney must remove that presumption by
showing affirmatively the most perfect good faith,
the absence of undue influence, a fair price, knowledge, intention, and freedom of action by the
client, and also that he gave his client full information and disinterested advice.'
ttNot only was the burden placed upon Woolley to show a full and fair disclosure of all facts
within his knowledge, but it was also his duty to
show that the transaction was fair and equitable,
and that the consideration paid was adequate.
u~. ~· The rule of law in such cases is well
stated in Hogan v. Leeper, 37 Okl. 655, 133 P. 190,
47 L.R.A. (N .S.) 475 as follows:
u c:Whenever there exists between parties con:fidence on the one hand and influence on the other,
from whatever cause they may spring, equity requires in all dealings between them the highest degree of good faith on the part of him on whom the
confidence is reposed. If a conveyance is executed
by the other in his favor, the burden rests upon him
to prove that it was not procured by means of such
confidence and influence. It is his duty, before accepting the conveyance, to see that the grantor has
disinterested advice and full information.' "
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This court seemed to give full approval to the Oklahoma rule that, ult is his duty, before accepting the conveyance, to see to it that the grantor had disinterested advice and full information." It is noted, however, that ·in
Jardine v. Archibald, supra, this court stated that by its
decision in Omega v. Woolley it did not intend to make
independent advice an inflexible necessity. In that connection this court said:
uof course, among the elements which might
be of great importance in most cases in determining
alleged undue influence where a confidential relationship exists, is whether independent advice had
been received by the donor, and in some instances
without such proof the donor might not be able
to sustain his burden of showing good faith."
This court closed its opinion in Omega v. Woolley by
quoting with approval language from the Supreme Court
of Washington which could scarcely be more fitting nor
more appropriate for application in this case:
uThe following language of the Supreme
Court of Washington in Stone v. Moody, 41 Wash.
680, 84 P. 617, 85 P. 346, 5 L.R.A. (N.S.) 799, is
applicable to the facts in this case:
u (Where it is to the court perfectly plain that
one party has over-reached the other and has gained
an unjust and undeserved advantage which it would
be inequitable and unrighteous to permit him to
enforce, we do not believe that a court of equity
should hesitate to interfere, even though the victimized parties owe their predicament largely to their
, own stupidity and carelessness. It is well known
that many good people and people of average or
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greater intelligence are sometimes duped and misled by the skill, cleverness, and artifices of those
who are adept in the matter of deceiving their fellowmen; and courts should not throw about schemers of this kind a protection that will tend to encourage the practice of their arts. Such people should
not find encouragement in the thought that, by
keeping their machinations within the letter of the
law, they may find sanction for their practices and
reap the reward of their craftiness. To the victim
it is of little import whether his property is taken
from him by a bold and forcible robbery or by an
ingenious and unsuspected deception. The injury
to him is the same; and the evil effect of court decisions which permit the wrongdoers to enjoy the
fruits of his chicanery is of no small import when
viewed' in the light to£ public policy."'

Jardine v. Archibald, supra, contains this courts latest
decision upon the matter here in issue, and, if we correctly read the opinion, it is fatal to the main contention of
appellants. In that case some deeds made by grantor just
before her death were under attack by heirs of the grantor.
The trial court found that there was a confidential reationship between grantor and grantees, but further found
that there was clear and convincing evidence of the absence of undue influence. This court ruled that the record
contained evidence to justify the trial court's findings and
affirmed the judgment. In the course of its opinion this
court said:
ttlt is well settled that where a fiduciary or
confidential relationship exists between the donor
and donee, equity raises a presumption against the
validity of such transactions and the burden is cast

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

39

upon the donee to prove their validity and that
there was no fraud or undue influence by proving
affirmatively and by clear and convincing evidence
compliance with equitable requisites. This is so
because there is implied in every fiduciary or confidential relationship a SU;periority held by one of
the parties over the other."
Having accepted the trial court's findings that there
was a confidenital relationship but still no fraud or undue
influence, this court then said:
uThe court having found that there was no
fraud or undue influence, the question we have to
determine is: was there clear and convincing evidence from which the court could so conclude."
The foregoing means that in the case now under review the burden was cast upon Macfarlane and Kostopulos
to prove the absence of fraud and undue influence by
uclear and convincing evidence." They wholly failed to
discharge that burden and now seek to escape by asserting
that they were under no such burden.
The cases just referred to are applicable equally to
Macfarlane and Kostopulos. While Kostopulos was neither lawyer, doctor, nor priest, he so attached himself to
Gail during the last two and a half years of her life that
the trial court, pursuant to the cases above cited, was fully
justified in finding that the relationship between Kostopulos and Gail was confidential.
The court's attention is called to the fact that Peterson v. Budge, supra, is cited with approval by the Supreme
Court of Utah in Glover v. Glover, 242 P. (2d) 298, 300,
decided in 1952.
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The case of contestant and respondent could rest securely upon the decisions of this court in Peterson v.
Budge, supra, Omega v. Woolley, supra, and Jardine v.
Archibald, supra, but we feel justified in showing that the
rule for which we contend is supported by the decisions
of the courts of last resort throughout the land.
The basic facts showing the relationships between
Macfarlane and Kostopulas on the one side and Gail on
the other persist from the beginning of the trial until the
end, and because they do persist the legal result of such
facts requires a finding of undue influence unless there is.
clear and convincing proof to the contrary. Such is the
holding of the many cases which are cited below.
In the case of Coghill v. Kennedy, 24 So. 459, the
Supreme Court of Alabama ruled that a presumption of
undue influence arises where the beneficiary enjoys a confidential relationship with the testator and actively participates in the preparation of the will. In such case the
burden is cast upon such beneficiary to make proof that
there was no fraud or undue influence.
Pertinent cases from California are indeed numerous.
The controlling California law comes not from the District Courts of Appeal but from the Supreme Court of
California. The rule as announced by that court is particularly strong in support of the contention here made by
respondent.

In Re Witt's Estate, 245 Pac. 197, deserves special attention. From the decision in that case it appears that
Lantz was a lawyer and the attorney for Mrs. Witt, the
decedent. He was attentive to Mrs. Witt in her lifetime
and prepared her will making himself the chief beneficiary.
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The will was successfully con tested in the lower court and
in affirming the Supreme Court of California said:
uThe burden of proof to establish all of the
elements of fraud or undue influence was not, in
the instant case, upon the contestant, as is the usual
situation upon the contest of a will. The burden
was upon the defendant, by reason of his relationship of attorney to Mrs. Witt, to overcome the presumption of fraud and unfair dealing which is
automatically raised by the law as a protection to
a client against the strong influence to which the
confidential relation naturally gives rise. All dealings between an attorney and his client for the
benefit of the former are not only closely scrutinized, but are presumptively invalid, on the ground
of constructive fraud, and such presumption can
be overcome only by the clearest and most satisfactory evidence. Not only must the attorney offer clear and satisfactory evidence that the transaction between himself and his client was fair and
equitable, and no advantage was taken by him, but
he must also offer proof that the client was fully
informed of all matters relative to the transaction,
and was so placed as to be able to act understandingly and to deal with the attorney at arm's length.
Kisling v. Shaw, 33 Cal. 425, 91 Am. Dec. 644;
Cooley v. Miller & Lux, 1 0 5 P. 9 81, 15 6 Cal. 51 0 ;
Clark v. Millsap (Cal. Sup.) 242 P. 918. ~:- ::·
uBearing in mind that the burden was upon
the defendant to remove any doubt of the unfairness in his dealings with the decedent whereby she
may have been induced to will hi1n her property,
and to establish by clear and satisfactory proof that
he had acted in the utmost good faith and taken no
unfair advantage, it may be safely said we think
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that the jury, having in mind the testimony adduced as to the mental and physical condition of
the decedent, was warranted in arriving at the conclusion that the defendant had not sustained the
burden of proof upon him, and, therefore, found
that the will was procured by the undue influence
of the sole beneficiary."

In Re Witt's Estate, supra, has become a leading case
in California, and has been cited with approval and followed in the following cases:

Roberts v. Wachter, 231 F. (2d) 535, 538;
In Re Doty's Estate, 201 P. (2d) 823;
In Re Phillipi's Estate, 172 P. (2d) 377;
McDonald v. Hewlett, 228 P. (2d) 83.
In all of the cases following Witt it is clearly ruled
that where the attorney draws the will, or participates in
its preparation making himself a beneficiary, a presumption
of undue influence arises which can be overcome only by
clear and convincing evidence.
In Re Hull's Estate, 146 P. (2d) 242, sets forth at
page 245 the elements which must be shown to give rise
to the rebuttable presumption of undue influence which
in turn imposes the burden upon proponent of removing
presumption by clear and convincing evidence.
In Re Graves Estate, 259 Pac. 935. This case is of
particular importance in connection with Kostopulos. The
proponent was not a lawyer but a real estate agent who insinuated himself into the good graces of the testatrix and
showed up as the principal beneficiary under a will, the
preparation of which he procured. It will be noted that
in that case the proponent had taken the pains of having
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a doctor examine the testatrix at about the time the will
was drawn.
The Supreme Court of Connecticut, in In Re Hotchkiss, 92 Atl. 419, ruled that proof of a confidential relationship creates a presumption which shifts the burden to the beneficiary to prove the absence of undue influence. To the same effect is the Connecticut court's opinion
in In Re Kirby, 98 Atl. 349.
The Delaware court considered the necessity of the
beneficiary in a case like the one now under review being
required to see to it that the other party to the confidential
relationship had competent and genuinely independent advtce.
In Peyton v. William Peyton, 123 A.L.R. 1482, the
Delaware court said:
Confidential and fiduciary relations
have the same meaning in law; and as every fiduciary relation implies a condition of superiority of
one of the parties over the other, equity raises a
presumption against the validity of a transaction
by which the superior obtains a possible benefit at
the expense of the inferior, and casts upon him the
burden of showing affirmatively his compliance
with all equitable requisites. So, the principle is
well established that a person standing in a confidential relation towards another may not retain
benefits conferred by his principal in a transaction
as to which competent independent advice is considered necessary, except upon a satisfactory showing that the principal had such advice in conferring
the benefits. Wherever independent counsel would
be of real assistance to the principal in deciding
whether to enter into the transaction with his
u::. ::· ::·
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:fiduciary, it is the latter's duty to advise his principal to seek such counsel; and where in the circumstances of the case independent advice is
deemed to be indispensable, it is not enough
that the :fiduciary has urged his principal to
obtain such advice; the transaction will be voidable, at the election of the principal, if independent advice was not, in fact, had. The equitable
principle has its root in the fact that the parties are
not regarded as being on an equal footing; and the
court cannot be sure that the principal acted freely
and in such way that he ought to be bound irrevocably, unless it be shown satisfactorily that he
actually had the benefit of unbiased, competent
counsel, and fully understood the matter of the
proposed transaction. Application of the principle
is not restricted to cases where, by evil design or
contrivance to injure another, a benefit has been
gained by a fiduciary at the expense of his principal; for even though a fiduciary has no purpose or
intention to take an unfair advantage, equity will
not lend its aid to the enforcement of the transaction and the :fiduciary will not be permitted toretain advantage acquired as a consequence of it, if
the transaction result~ in inequality and injustice.
The purpose of the rule is not so much to protect
the cestui against the consequences of undue influence as it is to safeguard him against the results of
his own voluntary acts induced by the confidential
relation between him and his fiduciary the effect of
which with respect to his own interests he may not
fully comprehend. 13 R. C. L. 411, 13 67, 2 Pomeroy, Equity, Sec. 956; Bispham, Equity (7th Ed.)
Sec. 2 37; 3 Bogert, Trusts and Trustees, Sec. 49 3;
Rhodes v. Bate, L. R. 1 Ch. 252; Hall v. Otterson,
52 N. J. Eq. 522, 28 A. 907, affirmed 53 N. J. Eq.
695, 3 5 A. 1130; Slack v. Rees, 66 N. J. Eq. 447,
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449, 59 A. 466, 69 L.R.A. 393; Pattberg v. Gott,
102 N.J. Eq. 371, 140 A. 795; Graham v. Graham,
143 N.Y. 573, 38 N.E. 722."
In Walker v. Hunter, 17 Ga. 3 64, the Supreme Court
of that state held that a confidential relationship between
beneficiary and donor creates a presumption of undue influence which the proponent of the will must rebut.
In Abbott v. Church, 123 N.E. 306, the Supreme
Court of Illinois held that proof that testator's lawyer drew
the will giving himself substantial property was sufficient
to take the case to the jury. In the course of its opinion the
court said:
uAll the testimony offered and excluded by
the court from the jury tended to prove that a
fiduciary relation existed between testator and the
devisee Frank L. Shepard, who received a substantial benefit, and, in fact, the chief benefit, under
the will, and it further tended to show that the will
was prepared and drawn by Shepard. This proof
established prima facie that the execution of the
will was the result of undue influence exercised by
that beneficiary, and, standing alone and undisputed, would entitle appellant to a verdict. Weston
v. Teufel, 213 Ill. 291, 72 N.E. 908; Teter v.
Spooner, 279 Ill. 39, 116 N.E. 673. Any relation
existing between parties to a transaction, wherein
one of the parties is in duty bound to act with the
utmost good faith for the benefit of the other, is
a confidential or fiduciary relation. Such a relation arises whenever a continuous trust is reposed
by one person in the skill or integrity of another.
12 Corpus Juris, 421; Thomas v. Whitney, 186
Ill. 225, 57 N.E. 808. While it may be said that
the evidence of appellees in this record tends some-
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what to rebut the presumption of undue influence,
considering all the relevant testimony that should
be in the record, still it was error in the court to
exclude all the evidence and to direct a verdict. It
was appellant's right to have the case submitted to
a jury. The vital question in this case was whether
or not all the legitimate and proper evidence offered made a prima facie case, because, if it did not,
the simple error in excluding the evidence in the
transcript of the evidence before the probate court
would not necessarily be fatal error. It was reversible error to exclude all the evidence and to direct
a verdict."

In Re Eldred Estate, 207 N. W. 870 (Mich.), the Supreme Court of Michigan ruled that when the confidential
relationship exists between testator and beneficiary a presumption of undue influence arises, and the burden is on
the beneficiary to rebut it.
The Supreme Court of Missouri in Pilitzer v. Chapman, 85 S.W. (2d) 400, ruled that where a beneficiary,
in confidential relationship with the testator was ((active in some way which caused or assisted in causing the
execution of the will" there is a presumption of undue influence which does not disappear but raises an issue for the
trier of the facts.
The matter is put colorfully and quaintly by the
Supreme Court of Missouri in Gott v. Dennis, 246 S. W.
218, 223:
uEver since Sarah unduly influenced Abraham
(who also thated to do it') to send Hagar and Ishmael into the wilderness with but a bottle of water
and a loaf of bread, in order that Sarah's son, Isaac,
might inherit all of Abraham's property and Ish-
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mael should not receive his share, human nature has
remained the same, and undue influence has been
exercised by many other members of the family, as
good as Sarah, upon fathers as strong-minded as
Abraham, to cause them to make Ishmaelites of
their children and deprive them of their inheritance. But such conduct has never been sanctioned
by the law of Moses or Missouri. We hold, therefore, that the circumstantial evidence in this case
tends to show that the testator's (family' exercised
such undue influence over him at the very outset
of his married life as to separate him from his wife
and child against his will, in ord~r to deprive them
of their lawful rights in his property. Undue in-

influence, being once shown to exist, is presumed to
continue."
In In Re Bartle's Will, 13 Atl. (2d) 642, 19 Atl. (2d)
17, the New Jersey court affirmed a judgment sustaining

a will, but in the course of its opinion made this statement
at page 643 of 13 Atl. (2d):
((The difficulty in the case arises principally
out of the fact that Mr. Herr was named in the
paper as executor; he was legatee in the amount of
$5,000.00; and he was further named as a contingent sharer in the residuary estate in case the original
bequest of the residue for charitable purposes should
fail to become operative under certain somewhat
complicated restrictions imposed by the will. The
judge of the Orphan's Court said in his opinion,
and we think correctly, that (under the statement
of facts, it is clear that a presumption of undue influence has been raised, and that the burden of overcoming the presumption and proving that the will
was a spontaneous act of the testator was thrown
upon Mr. Herr, Testator's attorney and confidential adviser.' "
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An especially strong statement is to be found in the
New Jersey court's decision in Heims Estate, 40 Atl. (2d)
657, where the New Jersey court said in part:
u~. :~

* And beyond that, where the person to

whom the burden has shifted is an attorney at law
and the will is drawn by him in his capacity as attorney and legal adviser to the testator and in his
own favor, we think that the testimony required to
countervail the presumption should be impeccable
and convincing.''
In Hunter v. Battiest, 192 Pac. 575, the Supreme
Court of Oklahoma dealt with an attorney who had drawn
his client's will and become one of the principal beneficiaries. We quote from that opinion:
u* ~· * At any rate the burden would be on
the attorney to prove that it was not undue influence, and this burden would not be discharged
by a mere denial. Here the only witness to the alleged will is a convict, shown to be under obligation to the proponent and attorneys associated with
him, and he cannot therefor be said to be a strictly
disinterested witness. Nor is it necessary that the
undue influence be exerted at the time of or immediately prior to the execution of the will. If the
undue influence has once been exerted it will be
presumed to follow and taint every transaction
between the parties thereafter and such presumption of undue influence should be rebutted by disinterested witnesses.

ccln transactions inter vivos, where one stands
in the confidential relation of attorney to another,
if the attorney receives benefits during the existence of such relation, a presumption of law arises
that the benefits were the result of undue influ-
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ence; and in testamentary dispositions of property
the rule as to the legal presumption of undue influence is the same as in dispositions inter vivos,
except that the attorney standing in confidential
relation to the testator and receiving benefits under
the will must be shown to have in some way actively
participated in the preparation of the will or the
disposition of the property.
((When the legal presumption of undue influence has arisen by showing confidential relations,
whether in dispositions of property inter vivos or
by will, the burden of proof is upon the party seeking to make the benefit of such disposition to rebut
the presumption attached thereto by showing either a severance of the confidential relations, or that
the party making the disposition had competent
and independent advice in regard thereto. Gidney
v. Chappell, supra; McQueen v. Wilson, 131 Ala.
606, 31 South. 94. ~~ ~· ~·
((The law also presumes that an attorney will
so act and will so conduct himself as to leave not
even a shadow of suspicion that he has done anything to place his personal interests in conflict with
those of his client. If he has done so and has thereby secured an advantage over his client or a gift
or devise from his client, the burden is doubly great
of showing that such advantage or such gift or device was not obtained through undue influence.
uit might be said that in determining that undue influence was exercised in this case that the
court was guided by reasons of public policy and
by considerations which relate to the protection of
the client, to the due and orderly administration of
justice, to the honor and purity of the profession,
and to the dignity of the court itself. A will bequeathing all the property of a client to his attorney
in a capital case after the conviction of the client
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and his sentence to death, made while the appeal is
pending, and received by the attorney with full
knowledge of all the conditions, should be regarded
with the greatest suspicion. It is absolutely inconsistent with the duty, burdens, and obligations
which an attorney assumes when he enters into the
relation of attorney and client, and in fact is subversive of them. To presume that such a will was
made without undue influence, and is therefore
valid and effectual, would be fraught with the most
pernicious consequences both to the public and to
the profession. It would give rise to most unscrupulous and unprofessional practice, and the rankest
fraud could be perpetuated on unsuspicious and unfortunate clients."
One of the most interesting and illuminating cases
which has come to our attention is In Re Lobb's Will.
That case was twice before the Supreme Court of Oregon
and is reported at 14 P. (2d) 808 and 160 P. (2d) 295.
The trial court twice sustained the will and the Supreme
Court of Oregon twice reversed it.
From the Oregon decision it appears that Mrs. Lobb
was an elderly woman who had some property in Oregon
and some in California. Wilson was her lawyer. Mrs. Lobb
asked Wilson to write a will for her making himself
residuary legatee. Wilson's testimony was that she insisted upon the preparation of such a will but that he,
for a time at least, resisted the suggestion. He went so
far as to tell Mrs. Lobb that he would not write a will
making himself beneficiary, and suggesting that she have
it drawn by an outside lawyer. She then mentioned the
name of a lawyer by the name of Clark. Clark was not
Wilson's partner, but shared office space with him. There-
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after Wilson suggested that Clark call upon Mrs. Lobb
and write her will. Clark took the office secretary, who
assisted him and Wilson, to Mrs. Lobb's home, and a will
was prepared in which Wilson was named as residuary
legatee. Thereafter Mrs. Lobb called at the office and
stated that she wanted a codicil prepared eliminating one
of the special bequests. Neither Clark nor Wilson was
present, but Mrs. Lobb insisted upon having the codicil
prepared, so it was written up by the secretary and executed by Mrs. Lobb. The effect of the codicil was to
increase the residuary estate. Under the circumstances
the Supreme Court of Oregon ruled that the advice procured by Mrs. Lobb from Clark was not independent
advice, and that case was just as if Wilson himself had
drawn the will. The Supreme Court of Oregon rendered
its decision annulling and setting aside the will and codicil.
In the course of its opinion the court said:
((Mr. Justice Harris, in Kirchoff v. Bernstein,
92 Or. 378, 181 P. 746, said: (The rules which define the duties of an attorney when dealing with
his client are well established. The relation between
an attorney and client has always been treated as
one of special trust and confiden.ce, and for that
reason the law requires that the conduct of an
attorney, when dealing with his client, shall be
characterized by fairness, honesty, and good faith.
Indeed, so strict is the in junction not to take advantage of the client that, when a client challenges
the fairness of a contract made with his attorney,
the latter has the burden of showing, not only that
he used no undue influence, but also that he gave
to his client all the information and advice which
it would have been his duty to give, if he himself
had not been interested, and that the transaction
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was as beneficial to the client as it would have been
if the latter had dealt with a stranger. * :~ *'
uThe following comments upon the foregoing
from a dissenting opinion by Mr. Justice Bennett,
are peculiarly applicable to the present case:
u (These are brave, strong words, and with
every syllable of them I entirely concur. They fix
the duty of an attorney toward his client at a high
standard, but not too high, when we consider the
peculiarly confidential relation which an attorney
enjoys, and the fact that those with whom he deals
are oftentimes helpless from infancy or old age, and
are generally ignorant of the law, and of their legal
rights; and practically at the mercy of the lawyer
who represents them. Such a declaration of the
principles which govern attorneys will be an inspiration to the lawyer who cares deeply for his
profession and for its honor.
(When it becomes generally known that this
is the standard which governs the conduct of attorneys, and that the courts unflinchingly carry
the principles so declared into execution, there will
be an end of that unjust belief, unfortunately now
so general among laymen, that lawyers are mercenary and unscrupulous grafters, and that the courts,
being composed of lawyers promoted, look with
complacent tolerance and winking eye upon the unjust greed and rapacity of their erstwhile associates.' "
To the same effect is In Re Brown's Estate, 108 P.
(2d) 775, by which decision the Supreme Court of Oregon set aside a will which was written by an attorney
and which made him an important beneficiary.
u

In In Re Everett, 68 S.E. 924, the Supreme Court of
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North Carolina held that when a will is executed by or
through the intervention of a person occupying a confidential relation toward the testator whereby such person
is made the executor and a large beneficiary under the
will, such circumstances create a strong suspicion that
undue or fraudulent influence has been exerted, nand
then the law casts on him the burden of showing that the
will was the free and voluntary act of testator."
The Supreme Court of Virginia in Hartman v.
Strickler, 82 Va. 225, said:
uwhere a will executed by an old man differs
from his previously expressed intentions, and is
made in favor of those who stand in relations of
confidence or dependence towards him, it raises
a violent presumption of fraud and undue influence, which should be overcome by satisfactory
testimony.''
This court, in Omega v. Woolley, supra, quoted
with approval from the decision of the Supreme Court
of Washington in Stone v. Moody, 84 Pac. 617.
To the same effect as the foregoing cases are: Bancroft v. Otis, 8 So. 286 (Ala.); McElhaney v. Jones, 72
So. 531, (Ala.); In Re Cooper, 71 Atl. 676; Roberts v.
Wachter, 213 F. (2d) 535; In Re Doty's Estate, 201 P.
(2d) 823 (Cal.); In Re Phillipi's Estate, 172 P. (2d) 377
(Cal.); McDonald v. Hewlett, 228 P. (2d) 83 (Cal.);
In Re Johnson's Estate, 87 P. (2d) 900 (Cal.); In Re
Gallo's Estate, 214 P. (2d) 496; In Re Hotchkiss, 92 Atl.
419 (Conn.); Davis v. Frederick, 118 S.E. 206 (Ga.);
O'Day v. Crabb, 109 N.E. 724 (Ill.); Abbott v. Cburch,
123 N.E. 306 (Ill.); Tidholm v. Tidholm, 62 N.E. (Zd)
473 (Ill.); Bridwell v. Swank, 84 Mo. 455; In Re Swartz,
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16 Atl. (2d) 374 (Pa.); In Re Raasch's Will, 284 N. W.
571 (Wis.); Page on Wills, 2nd Ed., Vol. 1, Sec. 270,
p. 123 3.

In might be contended that the rule of the New
York court in In Re Smith, 95 N.Y. 516, is against respondent, but a reading of the case will show otherwise.
We quote from that decision:
ctThe mere fact, therefore, that the proponent
was the attorney of the testatrix, did not ~· !Z. *
create a presumption against the validity of the
legacy given by her will. But taking all the circumstances together, the :fiduciary relation, the
change of testamentary intention, the age and
mental and physical condition of the decedent, the
fa.ct that the proponent was the draftsman and
principal beneficiary under the will and took an
active part in procuring its execution, and that
the testatrix acted without independent advice,a case was made which required explanation, and
which imposed upon the proponent the burden
of satisfying the court that the will was the free,
untrammeled, and intelligent expression of the
wishes and intention of the testatrix."

Graham v. Courtright, 161 N.W. 774, is a decision
from the Supreme Court of Iowa which seems to hold
that a presumption of undue influence is not based on the
mere existence of a :fiduciary relationship. It is contrary
to all other cases we have found upon the subject.
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APPELLANTS' POINTS AND AUTHORITIES
Because appellants and respondent are of such divergent views as to what rules of law apply to the facts
of the case, we are persuaded that a categorical reply to
appellants' brief would not be useful to the court. The
arguments made and cases cited by appellants will be
given attention in a general way.
BURDEN OF PROOF

Appellants' argument begins upon page 51 of their
brief. Their springboard is the statement that the burden
of proving both lack of testamentary capacity and undue
influence was upon contestant and respondent. They end
their argument upon page 12 6 of their brief, with the
statement printed in italics that there isn't a whisper in
the record that Gail was ever induced to do anything
against her will. That statement entirely ignores the basic
fact that Gail was a childish and simple-minded woman;
that she was in confidential relationships with both appellants, she reposing her confidence and they accepting it;
that MacFarlane was Gail's attorney at law, her attorney
in fact and confidential friend, and as such, prepared
and supervised the execution of the will and codicils;
that appellants would be unduly enriched by the will and
the codicils and that Gail had no independent advice in
connection with the signing of any of the testamentary
documents. Appellants choose to overlook and ignore the
rule of law that the basic facts of the case cast upon them
the burden of showing by clear and convincing evidence
that the will and codicils were free of fraud and undue
influence.
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The rule so recently stated by this court in Jardine v.
Archibald has been the settled rule of this court ever since
its opinion in Viallet v. Con. R. & P. Co., 30 Utah 260,
84 P. 495, decided in February, 1906. No decision of this
court cited and relied upon by appellants involved facts
like those presently under review. We must conclude that
if the facts of this case had been before the court in the
cases ·Cited by appellant this court would have applied
the rule of the Budge, Woolley and Jardine cases and the
results would have been different.
All of appellants' conclusions reflect appellants' refusal to appreciate or recognize the rule of law that im . .
posed upon them the burden of freeing themselves from
the charge of undue influence by clear and convincing
evidence. Further discussion of that point would be profitless.
GOODNESS OR EVIL

On page 124 of their brief appellants conclude that,
uGoodness or evil in the hearts of the beneficiaries has
no materiality." Whether that conclusion is by way of
confession and avoidance we express no opinion, but it
overlooks the morals and the public policy out of which
grew the rules of law governing the relationship of attorney and client and other confidential relationships. If a
lawyer has evil designs upon the property of his confiding
and simple-minded client, he may be subject to no penalty
just for his evil thought, but law and equity alike step in
to stay the fruition of such designs.
COLLUSION

Appellants conclude that no collusion or joint effort
on the part ~f MacFarlane and Kostoplos was shown to
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exist. The existence or not of such joint effort could in
no way impair the validity of the trial court's judgment
but proof of collusion is in the record.
Kostopulos believed that the Swan family was
wealthy. His close adhesion to the family began just before Gail's aged father fell upon his last illness and had
ripened into a confidential relationship before the first
codicial was signed.
When MacFarlane took a general power of attorney
from Gail he assumed a trust relationship as to her property. It was his duty as such to protect the property
for Gail's benefit as against himself and all others. And
yet, when he came into possession of Gail's bonds and
stocks they were divided equally between him and Kostapulos. Likewise, when the savings accounts were adjusted
by him at Union Trust Company the amounts standing
in his name and that of Kostopulos were identical, and
the small amounts withdrawn from those two accounts
during Gail's life were identical. The values of the properties assigned to each in the last codicial is about $100,'
000.00. While the foregoing may not compel such
a finding, it is certainly ample to support the finding that there
was an understanding between MacFarlane and Kostopulos
for the division of Gail's property. Kostopulos' statement
to the witness Butler that MacFarlane made a mistake
when he omitted Os.car Beam from the codicil is likewise
persuasive that the preparation of the codicil had been
the subject of discussion and agreemen.t between the two.
DESTRUCTION OF THE WILL

It is urged by appellants that Gail never destroyed
the will or either of the codicils in her lifetime and that
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her failure to do so is proof that the documents expressed
her will uninfluenced by either of appellants. Such fact,
standing alone, may be evidence to be considered by the
court, but it cannot be said to be ((clear and convincing
proof." This is especially true when considered in connection with the evidence upon the point. The confidential
relationship between appellants and Gail was never interrupted and the pressure of the influence arising from it
was never relaxed. There is evidence in the record upon
this very point which is without dispute and which the trial
court could not ignore. MacFarlane drew the will and
both codicils in his own office and there is no evidence that
he ever entrusted possession of any of them to Gail. If
he had ever surrendered possession of any of them to her
he surely would have so testified.
The only direct evidence upon the subject came from
Mrs. Venita Frank, who was Gail's personal friend and
wife of her attending physician. Mrs. Frank testified
without contradiction that Gail, toward the end of her
life, frequently stated that she could not get uher papers"
from MacFarlane. (R. 561-2-3) Mrs. Frank asked Gail
why she did not demand them and Gail's answer was that
she had demanded them but Ma.cFarlane had replied with
this statement: uGail, you are a sick girl. You can't
have your papers around the house."
The trier of the facts could properly conclude that
Gail never had possession of the will or either codicil. He
could also quite properly conclude that the same reluctance which induced MacFarlane to prepare the will and
codicils himself instead of sending Gail to an independent
lawyer for that purpose, also induced him to retain exclusive possession of the documents after they were signed.
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APPELLANTS' CASES

Appellants have cited two score cases in support of
their contentions. None of them is authority against
the position of respondent in the instant case.
One group of cases cited by appellants involves presumptions. The basic facts which led the court below to
its conclusions are entirely missing from the cases cited.
Typical of the cases relied upon by appellants is Newell's
Estate, 78 Utah 463, 5 P. (2d) 230. In the Newell case
there was no confidential relationship. The presumption
discussed in the Newell case was one based upon the total
absence of facts, while the one now under review flows
from th.z basic facts in the record.
Likewise, the record in Bryan's Estate, 82 Utah 390,
25 P. (2d) 609, did not contain the basic facts which
must control the decision in the case at bar.
Two cases cited by appellants involved the presumption of sanity in criminal cases. Such a presumption arises
in the absence of facts, not as the result thereof. Those
cases throw no light upon the present inquiry.
Some of appellants' cases involve the presumption of
due care or the lack of it. No case cited by appellants
involved the confidential relationship and the rules relative thereto which were so clearly recognized by this court
in Jardine v. Archibald, supra, and prior cases which we
have discussed.
Appellants have sought help from the courts of California but they have gone not to the Supreme Court of
California but to the intermediate courts of appeal. The
California law applicable to a case like this one is stated
in Witt's case, supra, and no case cited by appellants from
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California could or pretends to impair the force of that
case.
For example, appellants cite Phillipi's Estate, 76 Cal.
App. (2d) 100, 172 P. (2d) 377. That case contains
this language:
ccThat Mr. Wilson was the attorney of the
testator and that a confidential relationship existed
between them is not questioned. Where such a
situation exists the rebuttable presumption of fraud
or undue influence arises where the attorney profits
from his dealings with his client. That presumption
can only be overcome by clear and satisfactory
evidence that the transaction between the attorney
and his client was fair a.nd equitable and that the
attorney had taken no advantage of the relationship and that the client was fully informed as to
all matters relative to the transaction. In re Estate
of Witt, 198 Cal. 407, 245 P. 197."
The rule so crisply stated in the foregoing quotation
may be found restated or approved by implication in all
the cases from California cited by appellants. The same
is true with respect to cases cited from other jurisdictions.
Many cases from this and other jurisdictions are cited
in connection with the question of testamentary capacity.
With the general rules announced and applied in those
cases we are constrained to agree. None of those cases
holds that the trier of the facts may not view a mental
capacity against surrounding circumstances. Here the
court, upon the whole record, concluded that he could
not correctly evaluate Gail's admittedly sick mind except
as it was further weakened and overcome by the pressure
of undue influence exerted by those whom she fully
trusted.
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Much of appellants' brief is devoted to the burden
of proof. Among the cases chiefly relied upon by them
are Hanson's Will, 50 Utah 207, 167 P. 256, and Bryan's
Estate, supra. Neither of those cases is at all like the one
now under review. While the facts in the Hanson and
Bryan cases are not in point here, the decision in each of
those cases nods approvingly toward the rule for which
we contend and which has been so clearly stated by this
court in the Budge and other decisions.
Appellants quote the following from the Hanson
case:
u* ::· ::· As to undue influence, in the usual
and less offensive sense, the burden of proving
affirmatively that it operated upon the will in question lies still on the party who alleges it, either
by direct evidence or proof of circumstances in-

consistent with fair dealing."
The italicized portion of the quotation has real significance. In the case at bar proof was made of circumstances which are universally held to be so inconsistent
with fair dealing as to require clear and convincing proof
of the absence of undue influence.
From Bryan's case appellants quote the following:
u::. ::· ::· The opportunity to exercise influence,

unless combined with circumtsances tending to
show its exercise, affords no presumption that it
was in fact exercised.

* :-.-

:E-"

The italicized portion of the foregoing quotation
reminds us that the facts of the instant case show circumstances which not only tend to show the exercise of
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undue influence, but which compel a finding of undue
influence in the absence of clear and convincing proof
to the contrary.
Appellants lean upon Buttars Estate, 261 P. (2d) 174,
but it gives them no support. The lawyer referred to in
that case was not a beneficiary. The case is distinguished
from the one at bar by the following exerpt from the
optnton:
u c:::. * ::· This is especially so in view of the
positive testimony of the subscribing witnesses
that she appeared to know what she was doing
at that time and that she was alone with the lawyer
when she made her wishes known, since the Will
itself shows she remembered who were rrthe natural
objects of her bounty" and that she disposed of
her property c:c:understandingly according to some
plan formed in her mind." There being no question of fraud or undue influence in the formulating and relation of that plan to the lawyer. * * *' "
Such is the quality of the cases relied upon by appellants as to the burden of proof. Upon the facts of
the case the rule announced in Witt's case, supra, is the
true rule by universal affirmation:
uThe burden of proof to establish all of the
elements of fraud or undue influence was not, in
the instant case, upon ·COntestant, as is the usual
situation upon the contest of a will. The burden
was upon defendant, by reason of his relationship
of attorney to Mrs. Witt, to overcome the presumption of fraud and unfair dealing ::· * *"
The Budge, Wolley and Jardine cases control the
instant case. No case or text has been cited by appellants
which impairs the force of those cases.
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CONCLUSION
1. A total invalid from early childhood until she
was 27 years of age, Gail continued to be disease ridden
and a social recluse. Of arrested mental and emotional
development she was utterly guileless and highly susceptible to the blandishments of outsiders. She gave her unreserved trust and confidenc.e to appellants, and against
their domination what intellect she may have had was
no protection to her. Her trust, her welfare, and her
childish mind were given to the safekeeping of appellants.
If in any circumstances she could be said to have had a
testamentary .capacity, that capacity was surrendered to
MacFarlane and Kostopulos, and they exercised it for her
to their own enrichment. The trial court was justified in
finding and adjudging that Gail was lacking in testamentary capacity.
2. The confidential relationship between Gail and
MacFarlane is freely admitted by appellants, and no
serious challenge is made to the findings of such a relationship as between Gail and Kostopulos. The obligations
upon appellants by reason of their fiduciary relationships
to the childish and afllicted Gail was enlarged three fold
by the confidential hold they had upon her father and her
-sister. When all of the facts of their relationship came
out appellants fell under the burden of proving by clear
and convincing evidence the absence of undue influence.
They wholly failed to discharge the burden. Upon the
record the trial court was fully justified in finding and
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adjudging that the pretended will and codicils were the
result of undue influence and therefore void and of no
force or effect.
Wherefore, respondent prays that the judgment of
the trial court be affirmed.
Respectfully submitted,

RAY, QUINNEY & NEBEKER
By Paul H. Ray
Grant C. Aadnesen
Attorneys for Plaintiff
and Respondent
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APPENDIX
MEMORANDUM DECISION
At the conclusion of the trial of this case, and oral
arguments presented by counsel, the matter was taken
under advisement by the Court. Since that time the
Court received written briefs submitted by counsel; also
the transcript of the testimony in the case. I have carefully read the briefs and transcript, and I have endeavored
to analyze all of the testimony given at the trial. After a
careful consideration of the record in this case, I conclude
that the contest of Mrs. Theo Hendee should be and must
be sustained, and that the Will of Wilda Gail Swan and
both Codicils thereto should be and they are hereby declared null and void.
The complaint in this case alleges that the Will and
Codicils be adjudicated null and void upon two grounds:
1. That Wilda Gail Swan was incompetent to make a
Will or Codicil.
2. That the Will and Codicils were the result of fraud
and undue influence exercised upon Miss Swan by the defendants.
In reaching the conclusion stated above, I deem it essential to discuss briefly and separately the question of
testamentary capacity and undue influence. To me the record in this case clearly indicates that Wilda Gail Swan never
matured either mentally or emotionally. The evidence
established by lay witnesses is in accord with all of the evidence given by the medical witnesses, to the effect that
Miss Swan had the mentality of a child in the age range
from eleven to thirteen years. Further, the record dis-
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closes beyond dispute that, by reason of health impairment,
Wilda Gail Swan, until she reached the approximate age
of twenty-seven years, lacked all of the contacts and activities of a normal person, and was prevented a normal
emotional development; that she was almost a total recluse; that thereafter, by reason of medical treatment given her, during the last ten or twelve years of her life her
seizures were restricted, her health somewhat improved,
and to a limited degree she enjoyed self-reliance which enabled her to go to town in Salt Lake City to attend her
personal needs and some of her business affairs. However,
during all of that time her activities were under the supervision of either her father, various banking institutions,
her sister Mrs. Hendee, her aunt Mrs. Martsolf, and by
hired companions.
It becomes necessary to discuss the case briefly as it
relates resp~ctively to Grant Macfarlane, Dan Kostopulos
and Ada Bridge.
As far as the evidence pertaip.s to Grant Macfarlane,
to me it discloses a shocking and reprehensible abuse of trust
which was imposed in him by and through and as a result
of the highly confidential relationship existing between
Macfarlane and Miss Swan. Grant Macfarlane is a lawyer
of long experience, and as such practiced before the Courts
of this State and the Federal Courts. In this regard he is
possessed of trained intelligence. Also he is a man of great
personal charm and ingratiating personality.
The record shows Macfarlane became Miss Swan's attorney in 1944, and until Miss Swan's death the relationship
of attorney and client existed. It becomes inconceivable
that Macfarlane could have been long unaware of Miss
Swan's mental frailty and emotional susceptibility. It ap-
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pears further that matters were not allowed to rest upon
the strict relationship of attorney and client between these
two individuals. Macfarlane became the close and confidential friend of Miss Swan. He became acquainted with
Miss Swan's family, consisting of her father and her sister,
who each exercised great concern over Wilda Gail Swan's
welfare. Macfarlane also became attorney and confidential
advisor to Gail Swan's father, and likewise he became the
trusted friend of Mrs. Hendee, Gail Swan's sister.
It therefore becomes apparent that Macfarlane, personlly and as a lawyer, had reposed in him full trust, faith
and confidence, not only of Miss Swan, but her father and
her sister as well. Thus, in such circumstances, it became
and was his solemn duty to exercise the most meticulous
care in seeing that he never took the slightest advantage of
Wilda Gail Swain, and that he never abused the confidence
she reposed in him to his own profit.
When the purported Will was drawn on May 2, 1947,
Wilda Gail Swan appeared at Macfarlane's law office entirely alone. At that time she brought with her a prior
Will, under the terms of which she bequeathed and devised
her estate to her father and her sister. Macfarlane prepared the purported Will, by the terms of which he hoped
to inherit property located in Salt Lake City, Utah. The
.record is manifestly clear that he did not at that time suggest· or indicate that Gail Swan should have independent
legal advice, or independent advice of any kind whatsoever. Moreover, he caused this purported Will to be signed
by Wilda Gail Swan in the presence of attesting witnesses
of his own selection, one being his private secretary. In
the circumstances surrounding the signing of this purported Will, Macfarlane certainly was in a position of such
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dominating influence that it was his clear unrevokable duty
to see to it that Wilda Gail Swan had independent advice in
connection with the preparation and signing of such an
important document. The only advice she received was
the advice given and furnished to her by Macfarlane.
It is my judgment that Wilda Gail Swan was incompetent to make the Will. However, assuming that if she
were technically competent, she at that time was so far
under the 'influence and domination of Macfarlane that
the document must be held to be the result of Macfarlane's
fraud and influence, and therefore void.
After this purported Will was signed, the relationship
of Macfarlane and Wilda Gail Swan, and the highly confidential nature attendant thereto, never deteriorated, diminished or relaxed. On the contrary, it became more
cemented by frequent professional and social contacts between Macfarlane and Miss Swan, and became strengthened by the play upon Miss Swan's sympathy because of
Macfarlane's eye trouble. He permitted her to worry and
brood over his affliction and to believe he was in financial
straits because of it.
When the :first Codicil was signed, the same circumstances and conditions existed as when the purported Will
was signed. Again it appears that no independent advice
was ever suggested by Macfarlane to Wilda Gail Swan.
Here we :find a woman who had never matured normally, physically or emotionally, pitted against the ingratiating and charming lawyer who had reposed in him
Miss Swan's complete trust and confidence. The result obtained under these circumstances and surroundings and
lack of independent advice was the signing of a document
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which, if given efficacy, would invest property in Grant
Macfarlane worth more than $100,000.00.
I therefore feel constrained and do conclude that the
signing of this document was induced by fraud and the undue influence exercised by Macfarlane, and therefore is
void.
During the month of April, 1950, Macfarlane pre ...
pared and caused Wilda Gail Swan to sign a full and general power of attorney, making him her attorney in fact,
under which instrument he had the power and authority
to exercise a wide discretion in Miss Swan's matters and
business affairs. Macfarlane did strengthen his already
strong hold upon the mind and property of Wilda Gail
Swan.
On the witness stand Macfarlane denied that he had
exercised the power of attorney, except in connection with
certain deposits of money in the Union Trust Company
and the execution of one lease. However, upon cross examination he admitted that, as attorney in fact for Miss
Swan, he procured from the Walker Bank and Trust Company certain corporate shares of stock belonging to and
standing in the name of Wilda Gail Swan. He also caused
a certificate representing 8 0 shares of Westinghouse Electric stock to be transferred to his own name, and a certificate for 100 shares of Utah Power and Light Company
to be transferred to the name of Dan Kostopulos. Thereafter Macfarlane claims to have received as a gift from Miss
Swan the Westinghouse stock and $1,500 par value of U.S.
bonds.
The record in this case shows that Macfarlane, for
legal services rendreed Wilda Gail Swan, billed her for the
same and was paid by her for all professional services ren-
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dered. The stock and bonds he took from Miss Swan were
received entirely without consideration. At the time he
took and received the stock and bonds, he also knew that
Kostopulos was getting from Wilda Gail Swan the Utah
Power and Light stock and $1,500.00 in U. S. bonds. It
appears that between Macfarlane and Kostopulos they received practically all of the income-producing securities
which Wilda Gail Swan possessed.
From the evidence respecting the stock and bonds, it
becomes abundantly clear to my mind that Macfarlane intended at all times to turn, and did turn, the confidential
relationship reposed in him by Miss Swan to his own profit,
and in complete disregard of all the obligations imposed
upon him by the confidential relationship existing between himself and Miss Swan.
Further attention is also directed to the fact that, in
the exercise of such a power of attorney, Macfarlane caused
money, deposited in the name of Wilda Gail Swan in the
Union Trust Company at Salt Lake City, to be divided in
several accounts. One account remained in the name of
Wilda Gail Swan, one in the name of Wilda Gail Swan and
Mrs. Hendee or Mr. Hendee, one in the name of Wilda
Gail Swan and Dan Kostopulos, and one in the name of
Wilda Gail Swan and Grant Macfarlane. The record
shows that each of such accounts were in the approximate
amount of $5,000.00. The record further shows that during Wilda Gail Swan's life the account in her name and
the one in the name of her sister and brother-in-law were
practically depleted. The record further shows that the
amounts upon deposit in the name of Grant Macfarlane and
Dan Kostopulos were subject to only insignificant withdrawals, and at the time of Wilda Gail Swan's death Kosto-
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pulos' and Macfarlane's accounts were in the amount of
$4,597.17 each.
This clearly discloses that during the time Macfarlane
acted as Miss Swan's attorney at law, her attorney in fact
and her confidential friend and business advisor, he accepted from her, in addition to compensation for all services
rendered, stock valued at $3,000.00, bonds of the value of
$1,500.00, and savings deposited in the amount of nearly
$5,000.00, totalling $9,500.00. At this same time he stood
by and permitted the depletion of Miss Swan's estate by
an equivalent amount which Dan Kostopulos obtained.
Substantially $19,000.00 was thus extracted from Wilda
Gail Swan's estate by Macfarlane and Kostopulos.
By the time the last Codicil was prepared and signed
on April 23, 1951, Kostopulos had assiduously and successfully wormed his way into the full trust and confidence
of Miss Swan, and it would appear that Kostopulos was in
competition with Macfarlane in the acquisition of Wilda
Gail Swan's property, and that Mcfarlane had to reckon
with Kostopulos in the disposition of Wilda Gail Swan's
property. It would appear to this Court, under the circumstances which Macfarlane and Kostopulos acquired the
stocks and bonds from Miss Swan, should have persuaded
Macfarlane that Miss Swan needed a guardian much more
than she needed an attorney in fact. Therefore, I find
that by the time the second Codicil was prepared and about
to be signed, both Macfarlane and Kostopulos had become
doubtful of Wilda Gail Swan's testamentary capacity.
Grant Macfarlane testified in effect that it was Wilda
Gail Swan who was doubtful of her own capacity. In any
event there existed substantial doubt as to her capacity,
and Macfarlane and Kostopulos deemed it expedient and
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wise, in furtherance of their own interests, to have the
testamentary document attested by medical men.
The apprehension of Macfarlane and Kostopulos, relative to Miss Swan's mental capacity, appears to be in
harmony with the feelings of Mortenson and Fitzpatrick,
who were called as witnesses by the defendants. Mortenson and Fitzpatrick both testified that Miss Swan had reacted to their friendly intentions by offering them bequests
of property. This proposal of Miss Swan's was rejected
by both of them and each stated that they would have been
embarrassed to accept gifts from her.
Feeling as he did, Macfarlane drew the last Codicil,
then made an appointment with Dr. Nielsen. It is significant that Macfarlane did not call either Dr. Pace or
Dr. Frank. Both of these doctors were familiar with Wilda Gail Swan's condition. After Dr. Neilsen had been selected, arrangements were then made for Kostopulos to
fetch Wilda Gain Swan to Dr. Neilsen's office, where Macfarlane waited for them. Dr. Neilsen made a physical examination, and in that brief time he discovered that Miss
Swan was a case for a psychiatrist. Dr. Neilsen then called
Dr. Drake, a psychiatrist.
During the examination and questioning of Miss Swan
by the doctors, Macfarlane and Kostopulos were either
present or in adjoining rooms, and Miss Swan was never
free from the effect of their influen.ce and domination. Dr.
Neilsen and Dr. Darke both became attesting witnesses to
the last Codicil, and each testified that in his judgment
Wilda Gail Swan was competent to make a Will, but certain disclosures made by Dr. Darke and concurred in by
Dr. Neilsen persuades me to believe that either the doctors
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or Wilda Gail Swan or all three of them were deceived and
confused and did not know what was going on.
Dr. Darke based his conclusion that Wilda Gail Swan
was competent upon his belief that she clearly understood
and had clearly in mind the persons who were to become
her beneficiaries. To satisfy themselves upon this point, the
doctors asked her who were to be her beneficiaries. She
then gave the names of seven persons, which were written
down at that time by Dr. Darke. Those names included
Oscar Burnside Beam, Mr. Hendee and Mr. Bridge. Yet
all three of these persons were omitted from the Codicil
which had been prepared, arid which was at that time executed by Wilda Gail Swan and attested to by Drs. Darke
and Neilsen.
It therefore is clear to me that Wilda Gail Swan did
not understand the disposition which was being made of
her property, and that the Codicil signed in the Doctor's
office did not express her free will or her intentions. Therefore, I find that the Codicil was induced by fraud and undue influence and is void.
As to Dan Kostopulos, I find that his constant and
persistent attentions to Wilda Gail Swan and her father,
which began in about 1949, was motivated by a desire to
gain the trust and confidence of Wilda Gail Swan and her
father with the intent to turn it to his own profit and advantage. I am compelled to conclude, from the appearance and demeanor of Kostopulos upon the witness stand,
that he could not be trusted or believed. Kostopulos was
approximately 14 years younger than Miss Swan, a married man, and yet over a period of several years he called
upon Wilda Gail Swan almost daily, sometimes several
times a day. In Wilda Gail Swan's home the evidence dis-
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closes that he pet and fawned upon Wilda Gail Swan in a
manner described by the witness Grace Folden as udisgusting." He pretended to be responsive in a wholly charitable
manner to every whim and caprice of Miss Swan. He
further pretended to be generous in the making of gifts to
Miss Swan, and yet the evidence discloses that Kostopulos
kept a record in minute detail of every little item which
he acquired for and took to Wilda Gail Swan. The record
further discloses that immediately after the death of Wilda
Gail Swan, Kostopulos filed a claim against her estate to
recover more than $2,000.00 which he claimed due him,
and when this claim was rejected by the executor of the
estate he brought suit to recover this amount.
Confidential relationship is not necessarily derived
from or become dependent upon the professional character
of either party. It is not necessary, in order to establish a
confidential relationship, that either party be a lawyer,
physician or religious advisor. The evidence in this case
makes it ·clear to me that Kostopulos with design and purpose ingratiated himself into Wilda Gail Swan's mind,
thereby gaining her full confidence and complete trust.
Thus, this relationship between them thereupon became a
confidential relationship. It was the childish Wilda Gail
Swan who reposed confidence, and Kostopulos who became
and continued to be the dominant member of the relationship.
It further appears that during the time when
Kostopulos was creating and solidifying the confidential
relationship with Wilda Gail· Swan, he sought to undermine in Miss Swan's mind the position and influence of
others who might share her confidence to his disadvantage.
The evidence discloses he sought to impair the relationship
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between Wilda Gail Swan and her sister Mrs. Hendee. It
appears further that he even had the hardihood to encourage Dr. Frank to dope up Gail Swan whenever her sister
was about to arrive from California. The evidence further
discloses he disliked the close relationship existing between
Wilda Gail Swan and Mrs. Folden, and encouraged disharmony between them, and finally Kostopulos called upon Dr. Frank to dismiss Mrs. Folden from attendance upon
Miss Swan. He further endeavored to alienate the friendly relationship existing between Wilda Gail Swan and the
Bridges, by telling Mrs. Hendee that she must keep Miss
Swan away from the Bridges because they were taking too
much money from Miss Swan.
Kostopulos denied that he knew anything about the
Will or Codicils until Wilda Gail Swan's death. I do not
believe this denial on his part. I am inclined to believe the
testimony of Mr. Butler, a wholly disinterested witness,
who upon the witness stand stated that before the death
of Wilda Gail Swan Kostopulos had said, in substance and
effect, that he was not worried about the condition of the
moving picture business because he had a rich woman who
was going to give him a hotel. At a later time the evidence
discloses that Kostopulos identified Wilda Gail Swan to Mr.
Butler as the woman who was going to leave him the hotel.
I believe, and therefore find, that Kostopulos was informed and knew, not only of the second Codicil, but also
the first Codicil, because the record discloses that it was
in the first Codicil that the property identified as a hotel
was designated for Kostopulos. I further believe the testimony of Mr. Butler, reflecting in substance that after the
death of Wilda Gail Swan, Kostopulos stated that it was
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a mistake on the part of Macfarlane to omit Beam from
the Will.
It is abundantly clear to me that from the latter part
of 1949 until the death of Wilda Gail Swan that Kostopulos maintained and preserved a confidential relationship
with Miss Swan under which he could and did dominate
Miss Swan's will, and that he fraudulently induced her to
dispose of her property so as to make him the beneficiary
of real estate having a value of approximately $100,000.00.
The record in this case makes it clear to me that
Kostopulos was guilty of fraud and undue influence, and
without such fraud and influence the disposition of Wilda
Gail Swan's property would have been otherwise than as
designated in her first and second Codicils, and I find that
both of said instruments are null and void.
I conclude it is appropriate to summarize the result of
the exploitations by Macfarlane and Kostopulos of the confidential relationship which they enjoyed with Wilda Gail
Swan. During Miss Swan's lifetime Kostopulos and Macfarlane each received without consideration approximately
$9,500.00 in money and securities. Macfarlane in addition
was compensated for legal services rendered. Kostopulos
received with Macfarlane's approval a 10-year lease upon
a valuable piece of business property. By the purported
testamentary documents, Kostopulos and Macfarlane
would each receive property appraised at nearly
$100,000.00. In addition each was bequeathed fire insurance policies, a fact which Macfarlane characterized as unusual. The second Codicil discloses that Macfarlane was
designated the attorney for the estate and Kostopulos
authorized to make the funeral arrangements.
If the Will and Codicils were allowed to stand, Kosto-
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pulos and Macfarlane between them would profit by their
confidential relationship with Wilda Gail Swan in an
amount totaling about one quarter of a million dollars. To
permit such a result in the face of the record made in the
trial of this cause would, in my opinion, stultify the law
and the bench and the bar. Therefore, I conclude that the
purported Will and both Codicils must be held null and
void, insofar as they would vest any property or thing of
value to either Macfarlane or Kostopulos.
This case, as it relates to the beneficiary Ada Bridge,
presents problems of particular difficulty. I am reluctant
to strike down the bequest of Ada Bridge. If Wilma Gail
Swan had been permitted to dispose of her property free
from the domination of Kostopulos and Macfarlane, so
that her meager mental capacity might have been freely
exercised, and if under such circumstances she had made
the bequest to Ada Bridge which is here under attack, I
would be strongly inclined to sustain that bequest.
I feel constrained to find that the Will and Codicils
are entirely void, because of the circumstances and in the
setting in which they were signed. I do not believe that
Wilda Gail Swan had the testamentary capacity to give effect to her own will and desires as to the disposition of her
property.
But even if she had testamentary capacity, considered
in the abstract, her childish mind was so easily domina ted
and she was so completely under the influence of Macfarlane and Kostopulos, who fraudulently employed that influence to bring about the signing of the documents under
attack, and the documents were so far contaminated by
fraud and undue influence, that they must be declared
null and void in their entirety.
As heretofore stated, I conclude that this contest
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must be sustained upon both grounds alleged in the complaint:
1. That Wilda Gail Swan was incompetent to make
the Will or Codicils.
2. That in any event, the Will and Codicils were
the product of and resulted from fraud and undue influence of both Macfarlane and Kostopulos.
Counsel for the contestant are therefore requested to
prepare and submit Findings of Fact, Conclusion of Law,
and Judgment, giving effect to the views expressed hereinbefore.
Dated at Ogden, Utah, this 14th day of April, 1954.
By the Court,

PARLEY E. NORSETH
Judge
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FINDINGS OF FACT
and
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
This case came on regularly before the court for trial
without a jury upon the complaint and contest of plaintiff
and contestant and the answers of the defendants. Plaintiff was in court and represented by her attorneys, Paul
H. Ray and Grant C. Aadnesen. Defendant, Walker Bank
and Trust Company, as executor, was represented by its
attorney, Athol Rawlins. Defendant, Grant Macfarlane,
was in ·Court and represented by his attorneys, Calvin W.
Rawlings, Brigham E. Roberts and Wayne L. Black. Defendant, Daniel Kostopulos, was in court and represented
by his attorney, N. J. Cotro Manes. Defendant, Ada
Bridge, was in court and represented by he attorney, LeGrand P. Backman.
Trial was begun on November 17, 1953, and continued on November 18, 19, 20, 23, 24 and 27, 1953. Plaintiff and all of the defendants, except Walker Bank and
Trust Company, as executor, offered evidence both oral
and documentary. After all parties had rested, all the
parties except Walker Bank and Trust Company argued
the case orally and thereafter submitted written briefs.
The court listened to all of the testimony and examined
all of the documentary evidence. The court also heard
oral arguments of counsel and examined written briefs.
Being fully informed upon all of the matters presented,
the court now makes the following
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FINDINGS OF FACT
Wilda Gail Swan, hereinafter referred to as Gail
Swan, an unmarried and childless woman, died in Salt Lake
City, Utah, on or about May 28, 1952, leaving as her sole
surviving heir at law her sister, Theo Swan Hendee, who
is plaintiff and contestant in these proceedings.
1.

After her death there were admitted to probate
a document purporting to be the last will and testament
of Gail Swan, and two documents purporting to be codicils to said last will and testament. The said purported
will and the purported codicils named Walker Bank and
Trust Company as executor. By the will, or one or the
other of the codicils, all of the parties hereto, except Walker
Bank and Trust Company, were named as beneficiaries.
After the admission to probate of said documents, and
within the time provided by law, Theo Swan Hendee, the
sister and sole surviving heir of Gail Swan, and one of the
devisees mentioned in said will and codicils, filed her complaint and contest by which these proceedings were initiated.
3. When Gail Swan and her sister, Theo, were small
children they resided with their parents, Mr. and Mrs.
Ulysses Grant Swan, at 118 N Street, in Salt Lake City.
Gail's father was generally referred to, and will be hereinafter referred to, as Grant Swan. Gail was, for a time, a normal child. She began her schooling in Salt Lake City in 1896
when she was six years of age. When she was eight years
of age, or thereabouts~ she began showing signs of nervous
disorder manifested by a blinking and rolling of her eyes.
When she was eleven years old she became the victim of
epilepsy which was manifest by violent and frequent
2.
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seizures. It became necessary to withdraw her from school
at about that time and she was never thereafter well enough
to resume her schooling. Her mother and father devoted
themselves to her care and attention, and sought medical
advice and relief for her both locally and in eastern medical centers. Gail's health went from bad to worse, and
she became a complete invalid unable during long periods
of time to care for any of her personal needs. During all
of her childhood Gail was withdrawn into the shelter of
her parent's home and was deprived, by reason of her condition, of any and all normal contacts and companionships
common to growing children. It was impossible for her
to engage in normal play. She had no girl friends and no
boy friends, and therefore no opportunity for either
mental or physical development.
4. In or about the year 1917 when Gail was 27 years
of age, drugs were made available to her which, if regularly and frequently given, had the effect of limiting the
frequency and the violence of epileptic seizures. But it
was necessary that Gail continue for the rest of her life
to be under the care of a physician and to receive medication many times each day to minimize the effects of
epilepsy. After 1917 Gail's health improved to the extent
that she could be up and about and get some measure of
enjoyment out of life. She learned to read and write to
a limited extent, and learned to play a few tunes upon the
harp. Her life continued to be supervised in almost every
detail by her mother and father and by housekeepers and
companions employed for that purpose.
5. In 1931 Gail's mother died in southern California. Gail was then 41 years of age, and her father
brought her back to the family home in Salt Lake City
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where he and she resided until their respective deaths in
1950 and 1952. During the years following her mother's
death, Gail's father saw to it that there was someone living at the house who could take care of the housekeeping
and cooking, and assist Gail with her personal affairs.
6. The property referred to in the will and codicils
here involved was acquired by Gail Swan's grandfather and
passed from him to Gail's father, who in turn deeded it
to Gail. The property consisted mainly of buildings in
the commercial section of Salt Lake City. Gail's father,
with the aid of persons employed. by him for that purpose, supervised the maintenance and renting of the several parcels of property and the collection of rentals until
a few months before his death. Management of the property prior to Gail's death was placed with Walker Bank
and Trust Company, a banking institution of Salt Lake
City.
7. After her mother's death, Gail's health further
improved to the point that she was able to and did take
some interest in the affairs of the family. She enjoyed
being read to and learned to play simple card games. She
was taught by Judge George G. Armstrong, her father's
lawyer, to collect rentals and to determine whether she
was being paid the right amounts. She even discussed
leases upon property with persons employed to look after
the property by or under the direction of her father and
sister. But Dr. Roy A. Darke, a psychiatrist sworn as a
witness by defendants, testified, and it is so found to be
fact, that she was incapable mentally of understanding the
language of a formal lease.
8. From the time of Gail's withdrawal from school
in 1901 until her death she was not only afflicted by ep-
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ilepsy, but she lived a life sequestered from all normal outside contacts, and until she formed the association with the
defendants in this case her companionship was largely
limited to that of her parents, her sister, her aunt, and
hired housekeepers and companions. As the result of her
illness and her sequestered and sheltered life, she never
matured either mentally or emotionally. At the time she
signed the documents involved in this action she had the
mentality of a child from 11 to 13 years of age. She never
reached maturity emotionally, as the result of which she
was unusually susceptible to any show of friendship by
any person outside of her own family.
9. In the early part of 1950 Gail's father, Grant
Swan, was stricken with a fatal illness from which he died
in June of that year.
10. The defendant, Grant Macfarlane, is a lawyer
practicing at the bar of this court, and at the time of
the trial had been actively engaged in his profession for a
period of 25 years. He is a man of wide experience and
trained intellect. He is possessed of a fine physique and
stature, a soft and pleasant voice, and with all is possessed
of an ingratiating personality particularly well suited to
find favor in the eyes of such a woman as Gail Swan.
11. In the fall of 1944 Grant Macfarlane became
Gail Swan's attorney at law. The relation of attorney and
client between the two came into existence at that time
and persisted without interruption until Gail Swan's death
in 19 52. During the years between that first meeting and
Gail's death, Gail called frequently at Grant Macfarlane's
office, sometimes for the discussion of business and sometimes on a social basis. For all legal services rendered by
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Macfarlane to Gail Swan, Macfarlane rendered bills which
were paid in full as rendered.
12. Not long after the relationship of attorney and
client came into being as between Gail Swan and Grant
Macfarlane, Macfarlane became acquainted with Gail's
father, Grant Swan, and from time to time called at the
Swan home to visit with Gail Swan and her father. Out
of those visits there arose the relationship of attorney and
client between Grant Macfarlane and Grant Swan, and
from time to time Macfarlane performed legal services
for Grant Swan for which he was paid by Grant Swan.
Macfarlane also be.came acquainted with Gail's sister, Theo
Swan Hendee, who lived in San Francisco with her husband. The relationship between Macfarlane and Mrs.
Hendee became close and friendly, and the trust and confidence which was imposed in Macfarlane by Mrs. Hendee
made the relationship between them a confidential one.
13. Theo Swan Hendee, plaintiff and contestant
herein, was two years older that her sister, Gail, and was
in all respects normal. She was graduated from college
in 1912, and. in 1914 was married to Harold Hendee. She
and her husband moved to San Francisco in 1922 and maintained their residence in that area until his death in 19 52.
14. During all the years that Theo Swan Hendee
lived in California she made frequent trips to Salt Lake
City to visit and be with her father and Gail. Often
when she could not come to Salt Lake City she paid the
expenses of her aunt, Mrs. Martsolf, to go from Redlands,
in the State of California, to Salt Lake City where she
resided with and gave assistance to the Swan family. In
addition to making many visits each year to the Swan home
in Salt Lake City, Mrs. Hendee frequently wrote and fre-
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quently called by telephone. She endeavored at all times
to be of assistance to her father and sister in connection
not only with their domestic but their business affairs.
It is found that one some occasions Gail Swan showed
some irritation toward her sister, Theo, but it is also found
that throughout their lives there was a strong, mutual
affection and devotion between them. It is also found
that Gail Swan had an abiding affection for her sister's
husband, Harold Hendee.
15. Daniel Kostopulos was for many years an operator of a motion picture theatre in Salt Lake City on
Broadway between Main and State Streets. He became
acquainted with Grant Swan and his daughter, Gail. He
visited them at their home infrequently until about the
year 1950. Beginning in 1950 the frequency of his visits
was stepped up until he was calling there almost daily,
and on some occasions several times a day, a practice which
he pursued until Gail's death. He was 14 or 15 years
younger than Gail Swan, and a married man. His constant and persistent attention to Gail and her father was
unnatural, and the court finds that it was motivated by
a desire to gain the confidence and trust of Gail and her
father in the hopes of financial reward. Kostopulos not
only paid persistent and unrelenting attention to Gail, but
he insidiously endeavored to alienate other persons from
Gail's affection. He endeavored to plant in the mind of
Gail that her sister was hostile to her. He was informed in
advance from time to time when Gail's sister was planning
a visit from California, and on such occasions he suggested
to Dr. Emory Frank, who was Gail's attending physician,
that Gail should be ((doped up" in advance of her sister's
visits. Such suggestions were made by Kostopulos to Dr.
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Frank in Gail Swan's presence. He suggested to Gail's
sister, Mrs. Hendee, that the friendship between Gail and
Mrs. Ada Bridge, one of the defendants herein, should be
interfered with for fear the Bridges might get too much
of Gail's money. The court finds that the relationship between Kostopulos and Gail Swan was such that it became
in all respects a confidential relationship with Gail reposing her full confidence and trust in Kostopulos. It is
further found by the court that Kostopulos made frequent and constant visits to Gail, and pretended to be
her most obedient friend, for the purpose of cementing
and securing a confidential relationship to the end that
he might profit from his dominating position.
16. Ada Bridge is the wife of Joseph Lamar Bridge.
She is young enough to have been the daughter of Gail
Swan. She and her husband maintained a small chicken
farm in connection with their home in the south part of
Salt Lake County. During the late war Ada Bridge's husband was in the military service. While he was away Mrs.
Bridge sold eggs and poultry and among her customers
were Grant Swan and his daughter, Gail. She made deliveries from time to time and formed an acquaintance
with Gail. After his return from the service Ada Bridge's
husband joined his wife in visiting the Swan home. During the. last two years of Gail's life Ada Bridge and her
husband visited the Swan home several nights a week,
and on frequent occasions took Gail Swan to their home.
The Bridges had six children and a home to look after.
Mr. Bridge had a business to pursue. They had friends
of their own age and with the same interests, and yet during the last two years of Gail's life they left their home
and their children and drove into the Swan home to play
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cards with Gail several nights each week. Ada Bridge's
husband was employed on at least two occasions to perform work in connection with the maintenance and repair of some of the Swan properties. Joseph Lamar and
Ada Bridge came to believe that Gail and her father were
wealthy. Gail endeavored to give Ada Bridge's husband
$3,000.00 to be used in the :finishing of a house which
he had under construction. Mr. Bridge claims to have refused to accept the money as a gift but went with her
to the bank where she drew out of her savings account
$3,000.00 in cash and delivered it to him. In consideration for such cash Mr. Bridge claims to have written a
note by which he promised to repay the sum. The note
could not be produced at the trial but Mr. Bridge testified that it provided for no interest, and provided no time
at which the repayment would become due. $2100.00 of
the amount advanced to Mr. Bridge was never repaid,
but credits in that amount were given to Mr. Bridge by
Gail. The court :finds that the persistent attentions of
the Bridges to Gail Swan was motivated by a desire to
gain her trust and confidence in the hope of pro:fi ting from
such show of kindness.
17. The will admitted to probate and under attack
in these proceedings is dated May 2, 1947. By that time
Macfarlane had been Gail Swan's attorney at law for
nearly three years. He must have known, and the court
finds that he did know, not only that Gail's mind was
childish and undeveloped, but that she was emotionally
immature and highly susceptible to any show of kindness
and friendship. During the period of his confidential relationship with Gail Swan, Macfarlane suffered an injury
to one of his eyes which required surgery. That difficulty

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

XXIV

APPENDIX

brought an unusual sympathy from Gail Swan and Macfarlane employed the difficulty with his eyes to play upon
the sympathy and emotions of his client.
18. The will was drawn by defendant Macfarlane
in his office. On that occasion Gail called at Macfarlane's
office entirely alone. She brought with her a prior will
under the terms of which she bequeathed and devised her
estate to her father. Macfarlane then and there prepared
the will now under attack and caused it to be attested
by two witnesses of his own selection, one of whom was
his private secretary. By the terms of that will he was
made the beneficiary of property having a value of nearly
$100,000.00. At the time the will was prepared by Macfarlane and signed by Gail Swan she had no independent
advice of any kind, but relied solely for advice upon Macfarlane.
19. The first codicil admitted to probate and now
under attack is dated February 20, 1950. Between the
signing of the will of May 2, 1947, and the signing of the
first codicil on February 20, 1950, there had been no interruption in or weakening of the confidential relationship
between Macfarlane and Gail Swan. On the contrary, the
relationship had continued and as time went on Gail Swan's
trust and confidence in Grant Macfarlane increased.
20. The first codicil was signed under the same circumstances surrounding the signing of the will of May 2,
1947. Gail Swan went to Macfarlane's law office alone.
Macfarlane there drew the first codicil and had it attested
by his secretary and a lawyer who occupied space in the
same suite. The lawyer who witnessed the will did not
know its contents and never gave Gail Swan any advice
in connection therewith. Gail Swan had no independent
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advice of any kind in connection with the signing of the
codicil, and by the codicil Macfarlane was designated as
the beneficiary of property worth more than $100,000.00.
21. In the month of April, 1950, two months after
the signing of the first codicil, Macfarlane prepared and
caused Gail Swan to sign and deliver to him a full and
general power of attorney making him her attorney-infact. Following the execution and delivery to Macfarlane
of the power of attorney, and following the death of
Gail Swan's father, Macfarlane, as attorney-in-fact, caused
certain changes to be made with respect to funds on deposit in the name of Gail Swan and her father in the
Union Trust Company in Salt Lake City. After the
changes were made by Macfarlane as attorney-in-fact there
were three joint accounts-one in the name of Gail Swan
or Grant Macfarlane in the sum of $4797.50, one in the
name of Gail Swan and Daniel Kostopulos and his wife
in the sum of $4797.50, and one in the name of Gail Swan,
or Theo Swan Hendee, or H. C. Hendee in the sum of
$4887.67. During her lifetime the accounts, except those
in the name of Macfarlane and Kostopulos were substantially depleted, while only insignificant withdrawals were
made in the names of Macfarlane and Kostopulos. At the
time of Gail's death the amounts still on deposit in the
names of Macfarlane and Kostopulos were exactly the same
-$4597.17 each.
22. As attorney-in-fact and attorney at law and
confidential adviser, Macfarlane approved the sale of a
piece of unimproved real estate by Gail Swan, the proceeds of which were invested in corporate stocks and U. S.
Government bonds. The stocks and bonds consisted of
100 shares of stock of Utah Power and Light Company,
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80 shares of Westinghouse Electric Company, and $3000.00

par value of U.S. Government bonds. As attorney-in-fact
for Gail Swan, Macfarlane took delivery from Walker
Bank and Trust Company of the corporate stock of Utah
Power and Light and Westinghouse Electric Company.
Thereafter, and in the month of April, 1951, Macfarlane
received from Gail Swan the 8 0 shares of Westinghouse
Electric Company of the value of approximately $3000.00,
and $1500.00 per value of U. S. Government bonds. He
also caused the shares of Utah Power and Light Company
to be transferred from the name of Gail Swan to the name
of Daniel Kostopulos, and permitted Gail Swan to deliver
the Utah Power and Light stock of the approximate value
of $3000.00 and $1500.00 par value of U. S. bonds to
Daniel Kostopulos. The court finds that acceptance of
the stock and bonds from Gail Swan by Macfarlane and
Kostopulos was entirely without consideration and was
in furtherance of their design and purpose to abuse their
confidential relationship with Gail Swan and procure her
property for their own benefit.
23. The second codicil to Gail Swan's will is dated
April23, 1951. By then Macfarlane had been Gail Swan's
attorney at law and confidential friend and business adviser for nearly seven years. The confidential nature of
their relationship had been made stronger as the years went
by, and Gail Swan's trust and confidence in Macfarlane
was complete. He had then been her attorney in fact for
one year. He knew that Gail was then immature both
mentally and emotionally. He also knew that Daniel Kostopulos had acquired a highly confidential relationship to
Gail Swan, and that he was a serious rival for Gail's generosity. He and Kostopulos were by that time doubtful of
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Gail's mental capacity to make a testamentary disposition
of her property. Macfarlane prepared the second codicil
and on this occasion, as on all others, Gail had no independent advice with respect to the disposition of her property. Instead of having office help attest the second codicil, Macfarlane made an appointment with a doctor who
was a total stranger to Gail Swan, and entirely unacquainted with her illness. He arranged to have an examination made by Dr. A. M. Nielsen. He then arranged
to have Kostopulos bring Gail Swan to Dr. Nielsen's office
where she could be examined and where she could sign
the will. Kostopulos took Gail to Dr. Nielsen's office where
Macfarlane was waiting for them. Dr. Nielsen made a
physical examination. He then called in Dr. Roy A.
Darke, and the two of them examined Gail_ Swan and then
and there signed the second codicil as attesting witnesses.
Macfarlane and Kostopulos were both present when the
second codicil was signed, but were not present during
some of the conversations between the doctors and Gail
Swan. When they were not in the actual presence of
Gail Swan they were in the adjoining room, and the effect
of their influence upon Gail Swan was never dissipated.
24. Drs. Darke and Nielsen both testified that Gail
Swan was competent to sign the codicil for the reason that
she understood the nature of her property and had clearly
in mind the persons who were to benefit by her will. They
both testified that upon inquiry of Gail Swan as to who
were to be beneficiaries under her will she gave them the
name of Oscar Burnside Beam, her brother-in-law Harold
Hendee, and Ada Bridge's husband, Joseph Lamar Bridge.
All three persons so named by Gail Swan as she was about
to sign the codicil were omitted from the codicil. The

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

XXVIll

APPENDIX

court therefore finds that Gail Swan did not understand
who was benefitting by the second codicil she had signed
in Dr. Nielsen's office, and that document which she signed
did not give effect to the testamentary intentions expressed
by her to the doctors at the very time she signed the codicils.
25. The court finds that at the time when Gail Swan
signed the will on May 2, 1947, she was under the influence
and domination of Grant Ma.cfarlane; that her mentality
was too weak to withstand the effect of such influence; that
she therefore lacked testamentary capacity to make the
will. The court further finds that the will was the result
of the undue influence of Grant Macfarlane.
2 6. The court finds that when the first codicil was
made on February 20, 1950, Gail Swan did not have mental
capacity to make a testamentary disposition of her property because her childish and immature mind was unable to
resist, and could not resist, the domination and influence
of Macfarlane. The court further finds that said codicil
was produced by the undue influence of Macfarlane.
27. The court finds that when the second codicil was
made on the 23rd day of April, 1951, Gail Swan was under
the influence and domination of Macfarlane and Kostapulos, and did not have the mental capacity to make a
testamentary disposition of her property. The court further finds that said codicil did not express the free and voluntary will of Gail Swan, but was the ·result of undue influence then and there practiced upon her by Macfarlane
and Kostopulos.
28. The court finds that the relationship between
Ada Bridge and her husband on the one side, and Gail Swan
on the other, was a confidential relationship. The will .and
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both codicils were prepared by Macfarlane, and Kostopulos
participated in the preparation and execution of the second
codicil. Neither Ada Bridge nor her husband, Joseph Lamar Bridge, participated in the preparation of the will or
either of the codicils, but the court finds that the bequest
to Ada Bridge was the result of undue influence exercised
upon Gail Swan by Ada and Joseph Lamar Bridge, who
occupied a confidential relationship with Gail.
29. The court finds that the will and both of the
codicils were the result of fraud and undue influence and
therefore did not express the free and voluntary will of
Gail Swan.
30. The court finds that Gail Swan's mind was so
undeveloped that under the circumstances and in the setting surrounding the signing of the will and the two codicils under attack in these proceedings, she was unable to
give any free and independent exercise to what mentality
she had and was, therefore, mentally incompetent and
lacked testamentary capacity to execute and make a valid
testamentary disposition of her property at the time she
signed the purported will and each of the codicils.
31. The court finds that at the time Gail Swan
signed the will of May 2, 1947, she was so far under the
influence and domination of Grant Macfarlane that said
will was the product of Macfarlane's influence and expressed his will and desire and not the will and desire of
Gail Swan.
32. The court finds that when the codicils of February 20, 1950, and April 23, 1951, were signed by Gail
Swan, she was so far under the influence and domination
of Macfarlane and Kostopulos that such codicils were the
product of Macfarlane's and Kostopulos' influence, and ex-
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pressed the wills and desires of Macfarlane and Kostopulos
and not the will and desires of Gail Swan. By reason of
their confidential relationship to Gail Swan, and the complete confidence and trust she put in them, they were able
to and did substitute their wills for hers.
33. The court finds that while Ada Bridge took no
active part in the preparation of the will or either codicil,
all three documents were prepared by Macfarlane, and
Kostopulos was present and participated in the events leading up to and including the signing of the second codicil.
The purported will and first codicil were so far a product
of undue influence of Macfarlane, and the second codicil
was so far the product of undue influence of Macfarlane
and Kostopulos, that none of such documents would have
been signed except for such undue influence.
From the foregoing Findings of Fact, the court makes
the following

CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
At the time the said Wilda Gail Swan signed the
purported will on May 2, 1947, she was mentally incompetent and lacked testamentary capacity to make and execute a valid will, and said will is and should be declared
null and void.
2. That when Wilda Gail Swan signed the purported
will of May 2, 1947, she was so far dominated by the influen.ce of Grant Macfarlane that he was able to and did
substitute his will for hers. The will was, therefore, the
product of undue influence exercised upon Wilda Gail
Swan by Grant Macfarlane, and is and should be declared
null and void.
1.
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3. That at the time Wilda Gail Swan signed the purported first codicil on February 20, 1950, she was mentally
incompetent and lacked testementary capacity to execute
a valid will or codicil, and the said codicil is and should
be declared null and void.
4. When Wilda Gail Swan signed the purported first
codicil of February 20, 1950, she was so far dominated by
the influence of Grant Macfarlane that he was able to and
did substitute his will for hers. The codicil was therefore
the product of undue influence exercised by Grant Macfarlane at the time he prepared the codicil and at the time
she signed the same. Said codicil is and should be declared
null and void.
5. At the time Wilda Gail Swan signed the purported second codicil she was mentally incompetent and lacked
testamentary capacity to execute a valid will or codicil, and
the said codicil is and should be declared null and void.
6. At the time Wilda Gail Swan signed the purported second codicil she was so far dominated by the influence
of Grant Macfarlane and Daniel Kostopulos that they were
able to and did substitute their wills for hers. The said
second codicil was therefore the product of undue influence exercised by Grant Macfarlane and Daniel Kostopulos,
and should be declared null and void.
7. The purported will and first codicil under attack
in these proceedings did not and do not express the will of
Wilda Gail Swan, but express the will and purpose of Grant
Macfarlane; and the purported second codicil did not and
does not express the will of Wilda Gail Swan, but expresses
the will and purpose of Grant Macfarlane, Daniel Kostapulos and Ada and Joseph Lamar Bridge. At the time Wilda Gail Swan signed the purported will and each of the
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codicils she was mentally incompetent and lacking testamentary capacity to execute a valid will or codicil. The
purported will and the purported codicils thereto should
be declared and adjudged to be null and void and of no
force or effect, and the estate of which Wilda Gail Swan
died seized, both real and personal, should be distributed
to Theo Swan Hendee, the natural sister and sole heir of
Wilda Gail Swan, deceased.
8. Theo Swan Hendee, plaintiff and contestant, is
entitled to a judgment that the purported will of Wilda
Gail Swan, dated May 2, 1947, and the two purported
codicils thereto dated February 20, 1950, and April 23,
19 51, respectively, are null and void and of no force or
effect. She is further entitled to a judgment ordering and
directing the distribution of the entire estate of Wilda Gail
Swan to her, subject only to the payment of taxes, debts
and the costs of probate. She is entitled to have judgment
for her costs herein expended.
Dated this 14th day of May, 1954.
Parley E. Norseth

JUDGE
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JUDGMENT
The court has heretofore made, signed and filed its
separate Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law in the
above entitled case from which it appears that Theo Swan
Hendee, plaintiff and contestant, is entitled to a judgment
of this court that the purported will of Wilda Gail Swan
and both of the codicils thereto are null and void and of no
force or effect, and that the entire estate of Wilda Gail
Swan should be distributed in accordance with the prayer
of plaintiff's complaint.
NOW, THEREFORE, it is hereby ORDERED and
AD JUDGED that the purported will of Wilda Gail Swan,
dated May 2, 1947, and the two purported codicils thereto
dated February 20, 1950, and April 23, 1951, respectively,
are null and void and of no force or effect.
It is further ORDERED and AD JUDGED that all of
the estate of which Wilda Gail Swan died seized and possessed, both real and personal, be distributed to Theo Swan
-Hendee, the natural sister and only heir of the said Wilda
Gail Swan, deceased, provided that such distribution shall
be subject to the payment of taxes and costs of probate.
It is further ORDERED and DECREED that plaintiff have and recover her costs herein incurred.
Dated this 14th day of May, 1954.
Parley E. Norseth
JUDGE
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